[to Dean Rusk, with whom he was meeting] No, those papers. I just want those papers on the desk. No, Mr. Secretary, I just want the papers on the desk.

Russell then comes on the line.

Hello.

Hello?

[softly] [Charles] de Gaulle’s going to recognize Communist China, and the question comes whether I ought to protest it rather strongly, or whether we ought to just let the government protest it.[note 2] For correspondence between French ambassador Hervé Alphand and Averell Harriman on the recognition issue, see “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France,” 15 January 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 30:1–3. You’ve got two or three questions in there for the record. Our disposition is to just let the government protest it, ahead of time, and ask him to defer it. He’ll pay no attention to it.

You mean the government of [unclear] Taiwan.

No, the United States. The United States government would just say to him in a message that we hope you won’t do this, over the Secretary of State’s signature, and then when he—

I think that may be all right, but I wouldn’t go too strong on it, Mr. President, because he ain’t going to pay much attention to it.

You’re not going to pay any—

It makes you look bad when he goes ahead.

Well . . .

Of course, we’ve really got no control over their foreign policy.

That’s right. None whatever, and when—

The time’s going to come when we might as well—we can’t talk about it now—but the time’s going to come when we’re going to have to recognize them—

Yeah, I think so. I don’t think there’s any question about that.

I ain’t too sure but what we’d have been better off if we’d recognized them three or four years ago.

I think so. It was the only thing Bill Douglas said—[note 3] Supreme Court Justice William Douglas supported recognition and was known for his out-spoken views despite being on the Court.

Politically, right now, it’s poison, of course.

Now, only—I didn’t want to wake you up last night, and the night before, too. But we stood pretty well to our original line we had with him in this—the president of Panama. You remember I told him that this was started by school kids, and they came on—their people marched on our land, and they killed our soldiers. We regretted the situation that violence developed, and we ought to restore quiet and calmness, and once we did that, we could have any discussions we needed to.

They came back immediately and said that we had to have a complete revision of all treaties which affect Panama, because that which we have at the present time are nothing but a source of dissatisfaction. And I told him, in response to that, that we must stop the—we make them calm, stop the rioting, and quit the violence, and quit shooting people, and get all the facts, and Mr. [Thomas] Mann would come for that purpose. Then I’d be glad to receive any suggestion Mr. Mann had.

He came back again and said that he spoke to President Kennedy in ’61 about this, and not a thing’s been done to alleviate the situation which provoked the violence, and something had to be done. I told him there was nothing we can ever do that justifies violence. We cannot look forward, or backward, but what we must do is review with responsible and able, trusted officials the situation and stop the violence. And that violence is never a way to settle anything. He and Secretary Mann ought to get together and restore quiet and calm, and we’d be glad to listen to them on anything they want to discuss.

They came back and told Mann in his first meeting—I’m reading from my telephone conversation there[note 4] Similar wording appears in a White House transcript of a conversation with Russell on 10 January. See Entry 1305-b, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, January 1964 (2 of 5), Lyndon B. Johnson Library.—when Mann met with them they told him he had to review the treaties, and so on and so forth.

Mr. President, Mr. Mann showed me some of the stuff that he had there where he’d talked to him that last time when he was leaving, when he said he’s going to withdraw all his recognition. He wanted to know whether to take down the sign over the embassy, and so forth.

Yeah. I see, all right.

You told him to come by here.

Yeah. Yes, I did. But what I want to do is just bring you up to—

Mm-hmm.

—this one quick thing here. This is the conversation.

Now, then, when they got down there, they said, “We got to—we can’t pee a drop until you revise the treaties.” So they came back for instructions from me. And I gave them—the State Department gave me four pages, and I wrote four lines, which I think I went over with you. [reading] “One, we have confidence in you and [Cyrus] Vance”—this is to Mann—“and we concur in what you’ve done.”

That’s right.

[reading] “We agree with your recommendations [in] the last paragraph on the flag issue. You tell the president we cannot negotiate under pressure of violence, in breach of relations, and that therefore his demand for agreement [of] structural revision of treaties is unacceptable. You should tell him that in the appropriate circumstances, when peace has been restored, we’ll give sympathetic welcome to discussion of all troubles and all problems.”

So Mann held to that, and they broke up relations and told him to get the hell on out of there. Now, they gave down their milk last night. But they came in—this damn Peace Committee—with a statement that we agreed to negotiate the revisions with them, so in the last one, because of the situation created by the Panama Canal. That’s what they proposed at this Italian dinner that I was having at 10:00.[note 5] The dinner was with President Antonio Segni.

Mm-hmm.

So I came back out, and I didn’t want to talk to you, but I just didn’t like the word negotiate. So I struck negotiate wherever it appeared and said we’ll be glad to discuss, as we’re always willing to discuss, with anybody, Khrushchev, anybody else, any problem. [But] we’re not going to negotiate any revision of treaties. And if we’re wrong, if we’ve done something wrong, if we’re in error any place, if we made a misjudgment, we, of course, will be glad to correct it. But we are not going to yield one bit on the instructions [in] the conversation I had and the instructions I gave Mann. We’re not going to do it by implication, or innuendo, or connotation that this means that we’re in the wrong or that there’s something wrong with the treaties.

So that went back and the peace commission considered that until midnight. Then they came back in and agreed to my deletions. So the language now says that [reading] “The Inter-American Peace Commission, based on its statutes which authorize it to offer its good offices to the states”—this is their announcement—“has arrived on conversation with representatives of the Republic [of Panama] and the United States notes the satisfaction and the reestablishment of peace, which is an indispensable condition for understanding and negotiation between the parties.

“As a consequence, the committee has invited the parties to reestablish their diplomatic relations as quickly as possible. The parties have agreed to accept this invitation and, as a consequence thereof, agree to begin discussions which will be initiated 30 days after relations are reestablished by means of representatives who will have powers to discuss without limitation all existing matters of any nature which affect the relations between the United States and Panama.”

Now, that’s the way we closed it up. Now, is that in line with your thinking?

I think that’s all right.

I want to be su[re]—

I think that’s all right, because we could not, under any circumstances, say we wouldn’t talk to them.

No, you’re too arrogant when you get to that—just won’t talk.

You can’t do that. You’ve got to always be willing to talk.

But we don’t want to imply . . . Now, the lead on the story out of the Panama Canal at 7:00—it was leaked down there—was that the United States had agreed to a revision of the treaties. [Unclear comment by Russell.] It took us four hours to kill that. Took us four hours.

That came in on the radio [unclear].

We had to call the head of the United Press [International] in New York and finally tell him that the President would call him himself and read him these instructions if he didn’t quit putting out that stuff.[note 6] Donald Johnson was a UPI editor in New York. But now that’s what we’re up against. I just wanted . . . Now, do you think the situation’s going all right up there?

I think it’s all right. It’s just been miscast a little in the press, but I think it’s all right. [Unclear]—

I don’t think they’ve gotten the press much. I think it’s pretty well—

That was the radio, then. It got on the radio because I heard it myself.

It came at 7:00, but we corrected it before the . . .

Maybe it was 5:00 this morning.

What are you doing up that time of night?

Well, I got a bad habit of waking up during the night, and it was right near radio time. I always listen.

Well, I wished you’d called me. I wake up about—

[Unclear] wake you up at 4:00 in the morning. I wouldn’t dare to do it.

Yes. Well, anyway, I wanted you to know that I think we’ve done . . . I think that we have . . . I honestly think . . . I honestly think that—

[Unclear] got time now . . . We’re doing pretty well. Doing a good job.

I honestly think that being firm with them caused them to cave. Now, that’s my judgment.

There’s no question about it, and we just had to do it. I saw that happen to poor old Eisenhower down there. His instinct told him not to go as far as he did, but all the professors, including his brother,[note 7] Russell was referring to Milton Eisenhower, whom the President had asked to make several visits to Latin America and who advocated a program of more generous foreign aid as a way of staving off hemispheric Communism. Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 103–30. who he thought was God, told him to go that way. And he did. And it just got him in trouble and got you in trouble, and it got the United States in trouble.

That’s all right. They’re going to blackmail us, and we’ll have to give them a little increase every once in a while. Have to sweeten the pot—$4[00,000] or $500,000.

Why shouldn’t we—Why don’t we build another canal? They’re always going to have this hell.

Well, I’m in favor of it, but you’re talking about a $200 million project.

Well, I know that, I know that, but we’re going to have this hell all the time.

Well, you’re not going to extinguish it just because you changed the locale. Whoever or whatever Central American government’s there within 20 years, they’ll be down here just like the Panamanians are.

I think, though, it would sure sober these up if they thought we were going to. I don’t see why you don’t—

[with zest] Oh, I couldn’t agree with you more.

Why don’t you have a few folks up there say—call on me to build another one?

I will. I’ll be glad to make a statement on that.

I think I would.

We’ve had surveys made, you know. And it’s feasible through both Nicaragua and Colombia.

I think you ought to get in this foreign policy thing a little bit.

Well—

I think you ought to give out some background.

I don’t mind talking about it, but I thought I said we agreed that the least we talked about this Panama [situation], the better off—

No, but it’s already settled now. I mean, it’s already made progress. You ought to say that, by God, that you’re glad that we’ve taken the position we have and that we . . . maybe we ought to have another canal.

Yeah, we’ve been subjected, we—

I think you ought to get your old maid friends, like Doris Fleeson and May Craig and some of them in there, and get Phil Potter and the AP [Associated Press] boy.[note 8] Fleeson was a Washington columnist, United Feature Syndicate. Craig was a Washington, D.C., correspondent for the Portland Press Herald, Waterville Sentinel, and WGAN-TV of Portland, Maine. Potter wrote for the Baltimore Sun.

Oh, May, she’s red-hot. I talked to her.

AP, and UP [United Press International].

I told her, I said, “He’s just standing like [a] stone wall there. He’s not letting this State Department or anybody bulldoze him. He’s standing firm for orderly procedure and American rights.”

I got a fight on with [Edmund] Muskie and maybe a little with [Mike] Mansfield. They want me to send that damn fellow [Frank] Coffin from Maine that got hell defeated out of him.[note 9] Coffin, who had failed to win the governorship of Maine in 1960, had been John Kennedy’s choice for ambassador to Panama. In mid-December 1963, Johnson—in a lengthy recorded phone call—informed Muskie, a Democratic senator from Maine, that he had “grave doubts about Frank in Panama” and preferred “to get somebody that’s either topflight career [officer] or that’s really carrying out my personal instruction.” Through an aide six days later, Johnson learned that Muskie thought that “it would be a pretty bad kick in the tail” to him and to Frank Coffin if Coffin did not receive an ambassadorial post. See the conversation between President Johnson and Edmund Muskie, 11 December 1963, in The Presidential Recordings, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, November 1963–January 1964, vol. 2, ed. Robert David Johnson and David Shreve (New York: Norton, 2005); and the conversation between President Johnson and Ralph Dungan, 17 December 1963, ibid.

Oh, I wouldn’t—you can’t send him down there.

I held it up. Tell you what I’m getting ready to do. I’ve got a boy named [Jack] Vaughn who’s got a master’s degree in Latin American studies, who was a private in the Marines and went to a major during the war,[note 10] Jack Hood Vaughn, a former Golden Gloves amateur boxing champion and boxing coach at the University of Michigan, took a master’s degree in Latin American studies from the University of Michigan. At the time of this call, Vaughn was the Peace Corps’ regional director for Latin America. In May 1964, he became ambassador to Panama. In March 1966, he became director of the Peace Corps. Albion Morning Star (Michigan), 3 August 1997. who has been in charge of a Latin American mission—two or three of ours—in Bolivia and in Panama and has a great way with the Mexicans, who’s want—speaks Spanish very fluently, and who I ran into in Dakar.[note 11] Johnson had been in Senegal in 1961 to attend the inauguration of that nation’s president. He had three or four countries in Africa. And he’s practical, and he’s able, and he’s tough as hell. I just think that—he’s 45 years old. I just think I’ll call him in here—he speaks Spanish good—and borrow him from the Peace Corps, and just tell them the hell with him, and send him down there.

Is he with the Peace Corps now?

Yes, sir. And he’s in charge of all of Latin America for them. And he’s never had any problems with them. He not only gets along with Latin America pretty well, but he’s a tough operator with other agencies. [whispering] And he just whips the hell out of the State Department in his conf—

Well, that’s the one you need then.

[in normal tone] He beats them in their conferences over here in front of us. He just takes them all on.

That’s the man you need, then.

I don’t believe any man can go in the Marines a private and come out as a major without—

There—I . . . There’s a number of young fellows in this State Department or consular offices. There’s a boy down there in Guatemala, head of the consulate there, whose father is a career diplomat. I can’t remember his name.[note 12] Senator Russell was likely talking about Robert Foster Corrigan of Ohio, who later served as ambassador to Rwanda from March 1972 to August 1973. His father was Francis (Frank) Patrick Corrigan, who was ambassador to El Salvador (1934–37), Panama (1937–39), and Venezuela (1939–47). John Oscar Bell, of Maryland, was ambassador to Guatemala.

Well, I wish you’d get it. I need, more than anything else, young bilinguist [sic] people in Latin America. Tom Mann’s the only fellow we really got that’s a—you see, most of them wanted a European desk, most of them wanted to go to Switzerland [chuckles] to Paris or some other place.

This fellow is a Catholic. I believe his name is Corrigan, but I’ll check it—

Get his name for me.

I’ve got his name in my files.

Have you any real top men that you want anything for in Georgia that are real administrators?

Not right now . . . Not right now. I want you to appoint Carl

Sanders to something and quit running him against me for the Senate.[note 13] Sanders, the Georgia governor, had made a national reputation for his moderate stance on racial integration. It was widely believed, both in Washington and in Georgia, that Sanders would challenge Russell in 1966 when the terms of both men expired. Sanders declined to run and saw his political career end when he was upset in the 1970 gubernatorial primary to a then little known rural state senator: Jimmy Carter.

I wouldn’t run him against you for anything.

Well, [in] that big piece down there, [Ralph] McGill said he was going to run, and then this [J. B.] Fuqua says that he’s Johnson’s choice. Came out today in the Augusta paper down there.[note 14] Ralph McGill was the editor of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. J. B. Fuqua was the chair of the Georgia Democratic Party, a racial moderate, and the owner of an Augusta television station. He was also a friend of Johnson, and in 1962, he, Carl Sanders, Ernest Vandiver, and Senator Russell had gone hunting together at the LBJ Ranch. Fuqua wrote in his memoirs that he was scheduled to visit Johnson on the day that Johnson died in January 1973. He arrived an hour too late, however. Waiting on the LBJ Ranch’s landing strip, as he remembers, a secretary told him that Johnson’s last words to her were “I want to go get my nap so I’ll be fresh when J.B. gets here.” J. B. Fuqua, Fuqua: How I Made My Fortune Using Other People’s Money (Marietta, GA: Longstreet, 2002), pp. 219–24.

I would resign—

Said he showed that, said that he showed he’s Johnson’s choice, because he had him up there among all the others from the Southeast, that he sees this great young leader of the South coming.

Well, I did that—Lady Bird did that, [Russell laughs] for one reason, because he’s from your state.[note 15] Lady Bird Johnson had invited Carl Sanders to be one of four people to sit in her box during her husband’s first address to Congress as president. That’s why she did that.

I’ll tell you—and Ralph McGill made a speech at Davidson College here three days ago and said, “We are satisfied now that we can beat Russell.”

You wait until Lady Bird gives you that party down there. [Russell laughs.] We just don’t want to overdo it with you, because you’ve got problems [with] civil rights, and I don’t want them to think you’re taking up with a no-good, but . . .

I don’t want to put anything on you, either. I look after my friends [as] good as they look after me.

You don’t need to worry about anybody ever running against you if I’ve got one ounce of influence.

Well, I was, of course, believing you on that—

Well . . .

—but they did say it. Ain’t no question about it. I’ll bring copies of—

Lady Bird thought she was trying to be nice [unclear].

Well, that’s not—that wasn’t it all together. It was natural. It was—

And you brought him down there. I didn’t bring him down there. I never saw Sanders until you brought him down there.

He’s a hell of a nice boy.

I know it, but—

And he’s got a lot on the ball.

I have—

He could go a long way.

He’s just about the difference—the same relationship—my relationship with Sanders is just compared to you . . . is just like my relationship to George Aiken compared to you.[note 16] Aiken was a moderate Republican senator from Vermont who was a champion of the Food Stamp Program.

[Laughs.] Well, I wouldn’t—

Just as different.

I wasn’t complaining about that. I was teasing you, of course. I wouldn’t have said it over the phone if I hadn’t been teasing.

Well, I do need some real young, able, Bobby Russell –type fellows.[note 17] Bobby Russell was a state judge in Georgia and a nephew of Senator Russell. I got a deputy postmaster general that administers that Post Office Department, and it’s a hell of a business operation.[note 18] The day before, Johnson received word that the deputy postmaster Sid Bishop was resigning to take a corporate job.

It sure is.

But I need a young able administrator that could do it, and—

That’s got some vision, not hidebound, and is not prejudiced—

—and I need some people in some of these State [Department] things. I could send one or two if we had a good Georgia boy; I could make him ambassador someplace.

Well, now, [Thomas] Mann asked me about Tapley Bennett.[note 19] Bennett, who was appointed ambassador to the Dominican Republic in March 1964, became better known the next year after a military rebellion erupted in that Caribbean nation. His incomplete reporting helped contribute to Johnson’s conviction to send in nearly 25,000 U.S. Marines, a move widely criticized both at home and abroad. Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 36–44. He was over in Greece. He said he’s going to try to get you to send him to Latin America. His daddy is one of my best friends. I helped raise him. He’s a hell of a good boy. He’s consul in Greece.

Mann asked me today what I thought about him. I said, “I think he’s one of the smartest young fellows I know.” He said, “I do, too,” and said, “I’m going to try to get him over here and send him down to Latin America.” Said, “That’s where he belongs.” Said he was down there for a number of years. He don’t belong over in Greece. But then I—if I see anybody [who] can help the administration or help you, I’ll let you know.

All right. Good-bye, much obliged. I just—this de Gaulle thing, you just think we ought to play it as low key and just make a little protest for the record?

I’d play it low key, and for the record make a protest against him. I sure would.

But you wouldn’t personally do it?

No, I wouldn’t. I’d let the Secretary of State do it. That’s government, that’s you. He’s your spokesman in those matters. I wouldn’t sign it personally.

Now you do a little bit of talking—

There’s going to be a time [when] you’re going to have to get together with old man de Gaulle, and when you go to talking to him, I want it to be under the best circumstances possible.

You do a little talking, maybe a statement to these press people up there on this Panama thing, now, while it’s hot. Mr. Nixon’s trying to butt into it, and I think we cut his water off pretty quick by settling it.

Well, maybe so. It would be ridiculous to have him trying to advise [unclear]—

No, but he is. He is. But you can point that out in talking to them.

[chuckling] Well, all right.

Good-bye.

I will. Bye.