Six o’clock this evening. We’re going to have a little press conference.

Tom?

Yes, sir.

Are we going to call in these Latin American ambassadors for the Alliance for Progress meeting?

Yes, sir. We have it tentatively scheduled for about the 15th.

About the 15th?

Of March.

That’s the American ambassadors in this hemisphere?

Well, it’s a number of things. We thought we would have a ceremony at the Pan American Union.[note 1] See the conversation between President Johnson and Ralph Dungan, 4 February 1964, in this volume. You would—

Wuh—Yeah, but I’m talking about—We’re inviting to come to Washington [unclear comment by Mann] the American ambassadors in this hemisphere?

The American—I thought we would do that at the same time.

That’s what I’m saying.

And combine that. We’ve got a budgetary problem, but I think we can find the money.

Yeah.

And get them all up here at that time and make a big shindig and launch your Alliance program with a good speech.

All right. Now, what is that—the anniversary of the Alliance?

It’s the third anniversary of Kennedy’s . . .

Announcement of it.

Yeah.

Third anniversary of Kennedy’s announcement of the Alliance.

And it’s also the occasion for creating the . . . launching this new CIAP.[note 2] CIAP was the Spanish acronym for the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, which had been established in late 1963 to allow for some Alliance for Progress programs to assume a multilateral form. William Walker, “Mixing the Sweet with the Sour,” in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s, ed. Diane Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 61. This Inter-American thing, when Santamaria takes office.[note 3] Carlos Sanz de Santamaria was president of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and the former finance minister and ambassador to the United States from Colombia.

[slowly, as if taking notes’] It’s also the occasion for the launching of this CIAP that . . .

CIAP thing.

Santamaria’s the head of . . . from Colombia.

What do you call that, the Wise Men? Is that what they’re called?

No, that’s a different group. I would call this the Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee.

The Inter-American Alliance for Progress Committee. That’s made up of five people?

It’s made up of seven people, counting Santamaria, the president.

Seven, counting Santamaria, the president.

Mm-hmm.

They raised hell about us not giving him enough attention here. I don’t know how much more we could give him. We had him in here, and we had him . . . had him . . . had his picture made and everything else.

I—

I couldn’t put him on my knee and bounce him.

I think he was happy, and . . . I don’t think . . . I hadn’t even heard of any criticism on that.

Well, I did. I saw the papers. [They] said that we ignored him and paid no attention to him, and so forth. Didn’t emphasize it enough, [said] your New York Times sources over there.

Well, he may . . . he had a little press conference, and I heard him, and as he came out of your office, it was all very complimentary to you personally and to the Alliance.

Have you talked to the admiral [John Bulkeley] today? Has he sawed up any more pipe down there?[note 4] Responding to Castro, Rear Admiral John Bulkeley, commander of the Guantanamo Naval Base, had cut the lines that brought water to the base the day before.

[laughing] I haven’t talked to him today.

Anything . . . Is everything going all right in Guantanamo?

Everything’s going fine. I—

Did you read your New York Times State Department on Cuba this morning and how you’d screwed up things good?[note 5] Max Frankel, in an analysis piece entitled “Confusion on Cuba,” asserted that President Johnson’s Latin American policy was worrying allies and aiding Castro. New York Times, 19 February 1964.

Well, I can give you some bright stories. I had an hour and a half yesterday—

The answer is no, I guess, to my question.

Sir?

I guess the answer—

Answer’s no. [Chuckles.]

Yeah, all right. Read it on the second page this morning because you have to know what they’re saying about you.

I read that. Let me give you some bright news.

All right.

[with President Johnson acknowledging] Yesterday I spent an hour and a half before the House Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs. Even the Republicans are happy. This morning I spent another hour, just at random in the Congress. We talked largely about Panama, and they asked for additional meetings, and it went very well.

So we’re working hard on the Hill, like you want us to, and I think we’re going to make a lot of progress up there. I don’t know what you can do with some of these left-wing fellows, and two or three newspapers. I think they just—

Well, why in the hell don’t you tell that guy that you-all leak to over there all the time—the State Department—you got one named [Tad] Szulc, and one named [Henry] Raymont, is it?[note 6] Szulc covered Latin America for the New York Times; Raymont covered foreign policy issues for the Washington Post.

That’s right, and a guy named [Dan] Kurzmann.[note 7] Kurzmann covered Latin American affairs for the Washington Post.

And that you-all just work like a sieve to—Why don’t you say, “Now, you and Herbert Matthews didn’t handle this Cuban situation in such an excellent fashion yourself.[note 8] Herbert Matthews, a New York Times reporter, had painted a flattering picture of Fidel Castro’s revolution in 1959 and 1960. Now, for God’s sakes, give me a little chance. I’ve just been here two months. Give me a little chance to retrieve some of the work you-all did”?

[chuckling] All right, I’ll try that line on them. [Johnson chuckles too.] OK, sir.

I think that we’ve got to get something to show that we’ve got better feeling and more respect in the hemisphere than ever before, so you better propagandize some folks along that line. And I guess that we can have a dinner for the ambassadors from America: our ambassadors to the hemisphere, their ambassadors to us, and probably the OAS [Organization of American States] ambassadors, and—

And the seven people on CIAP ought to be all there, I think. And maybe even the ten Wise Men, if we could get them.

Well, what would that be—65, 70?

That would run you close to 70 or 80.

Well, but the wives, you see—140. You can’t take care of 125. We’ll try to give a dinner like that for them.

All right. Wonderful. And I’ll—

I want you to dance with some of those short, fat women again. I . . . [Mann chuckles.] Old Mennen Williams was the only guy that delivered for me last night.[note 9] Williams, the former Democratic governor of Michigan, was assistant secretary of state for African affairs. [Pierre] Salinger went home, and . . .

I’m the [unclear] worst dancer, but—

Larry O’Brien . . .

—I’ll even do that for you, Mr. President.

All right. Anything else now on Panama?

No, everything’s quiet down there. The boys aren’t going to do much until we get back from Los Angeles. I had a talk with [Vicente] Sanchez Gavito this morning and told him to keep everything buttoned down until we got back.[note 10] Sanchez Gavito was the Mexican special emissary on the issue.

I don’t think we’re going to do anything until after that election down there.[note 11] In late May, President Roberto Chiari’s candidate for his successor, Marco A. Robles, narrowly defeated Arnulfo Arias in the Panamanian election.

I doubt it myself.

I wouldn’t encourage them much. I think we’re doing all right. Just let them have their problem. They did the invading, and they did the aggression, and let’s see how they . . . I’m not one that believes that a fat Communist is better than a lean one.

No, I’m not. I think we’re going to have to have a lot of steady nerves on some of these problems.

I sure would, and I would, though, have a planning group awful busy with the World Bank and Export-Import Bank, and the Alliance for Progress, and the health organizations, and the 480s.[note 12] President Johnson was referring to Public Law 480, better known as Food for Peace.

I see now we’re trying to figure out how to give Mexico some food. I saw in one of the briefing papers that she wanted water, and we might not be able to give her water, but we could give her food. I don’t know I’d want to be giving away, but I’d damn sure have some things on my Santa Claus list and coordinate them and then when I did something, I’d make them kind of have a quid pro quo.

Well, that’s what we’ve been—

I think that you have . . . I think you’ve turned a flop in Mexico. I think you’ve got them to where instead of confiscating everything now, they’re trying to promote private enterprise, aren’t they?[note 13] U.S.-Mexican relations had reached a crisis in 1938, after Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas expropriated U.S. oil holdings in the country.

That’s our hope, and they’re drifting in that direction. We still have a lot of problems. We have to stay with this thing day by day, but I’m not pessimistic about Mexico. Got a good President [Diaz Ordaz] coming in, and . . . [note 14] For many students in Mexico, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz did not fully live up to Mann’s predictions expressed here. He was President during the October 1968 Tlatelolco massacre and responsible for other crackdowns on democracy and student protests. Diaz Ordaz nevertheless succeeded in winning support from Washington for his regime during his term, which lasted from 1964 to 1970.

Mm-hmm. . . . What other places in the hemisphere have you got problems? Argentina? Brazil?

This hemisphere is in worse shape than I’ve seen it in 20 years. We’ve got problems in—well, in Bolivia right now. The cabinet—Paz is the only man there that can hold things together, and his whole cabinet is splintering in all directions because they want to be president four years from now.[note 15] Victor Paz Estensoro was president of Bolivia. Ironically, in late 1964 the administration provided quiet assistance to a coup that toppled Paz’s government and replaced it with a military regime headed by General Rene Barrientos. William Walker, “Mixing the Sweet with the Sour,” in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade, ed. Kunz, p. 63.

Well, can we get in there and do something to help him before it goes to hell?

We’re working on that this morning, and we’re coming up with some ideas on that.

We’ve got a possible revolt in the military against the military fellow in Honduras.[note 16] Osvaldo López Arellano had led a military coup in Honduras in September 1963.

Yeah.

We’re watching that closely.

Honduras.

We’ve got Peru and Argentina about to expropriate oil properties. Brazil is sick. [Joao] Goulart is irresponsible.[note 17] Goulart, President of Brazil, was overthrown in a U.S.-supported coup less than two months later. Nearly everywhere we look, we have problems, but I’m sort of optimistic.

I think what we did in Panama and Guantanamo is going to help us a lot in the hemisphere, and we need time. We need about—

Well, why don’t you try to sell this New York Times on the problem that you need help, and that this thing you picked up [was] pretty sick, and that you can’t do it by just being a floor mop, and you’ve got to have a little steel in your spine? If you don’t, they’ll shove you to death. They’ll be like a country dog.

And see if you can’t get the Washington Post and the New York Times to quit taking the line they are.

I’m going to try it, but those fellows are basically hostile to everything you believe in, Mr. President.

OK.

The guys that write the stories are.

You know, I spent—I had lunch over with the whole staff of the Washington Post and made in essence this same pitch, and I was told later that Mrs. [Katharine] Graham after the lunch said that they ought to give us time to see what we could do.[note 18] Graham was president of the Washington Post Company.

But what you have is a half a dozen very far left-wing guys, like Kurzmann, who are pretty stupid people, really. They don’t know anything about Latin America. They don’t speak the language, never been there. But they’re full of theories. And these guys are crusaders. And how you deal with a crusader is, I think, the toughest problem of all. But I think we’re going to have to work on Mrs. Graham. I don’t—

Mrs. Graham doesn’t have any authority. She won’t exercise it. She claims she’s the best friend I’ve got, and they murder me every day.

Well—

That [Al] Friendly runs that paper.[note 19] Alfred Friendly was the Washington Post’s managing editor.

Let me talk to Manny and see if we can’t plot something out.[note 20] Manny is a phonetic spelling. I’ll get together with him and see if we do the most effective thing we can.

I think you ought to lay the groundwork and say that “Now, we need some help on American policy, and we don’t think that you’re doing your goddamned country a bit of good, and we wished you’d try to help us a little.”

All right, sir.

OK. Bye.

All right.