Lyndon Johnson and George Reedy on 28 March 1964


Transcript

Edited by David Shreve and Robert David Johnson, with Ashley Havard High and Patricia Dunn

See the daily introduction for 1964-03-28  [from the Norton edition]

President Johnson

George?

George Reedy

Yes, sir.

President Johnson

Anything more on the earthquake?

Reedy

Yes, sir. My reports between Defense and White House are slightly conflicting. We won’t worry about that. The situation in Alaska is as follows. Anchorage: power and lights—

President Johnson

Anything we can do about it?

Reedy

No, not at the moment. [Arthur] Sylvester at one point had a suggestion that you declare a state of emergency, and I said, “What in the hell kind of state of emergency?[note 1] Arthur Sylvester was assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. The governor’s already declared one.” I don’t think he exactly knew what he was talking about. I’ve asked him to look into this thing and call me back with a clear recommendation.

I’ve already told the press that you’ve been apprised and have expressed concern and are awaiting further reports. But one of the things that we really have to wait for is nobody is very clear on the effects of this tidal wave, which should be hitting Hawaii right now.[note 2] The seismic sea wave created by the earthquake did roll into Hawaii, Japan, and Siberia, but with less force than anticipated. Only in southern Oregon, northern California, and on Vancouver Island, British Columbia, did this surge produce dangerously large waves. Twelve were drowned in Crescent City, California, and four at Depoe Bay, Oregon. William H. Blair, “West Coast Hit by Tidal Waves,” New York Times, 29 March 1964. The term tidal wave, used here by Reedy and New York Times reporter Blair, is a common misnomer used to describe the phenomenon of large, earthquake-induced waves. They’re expecting a six-foot wave. The only . . . the problem is what the force of that wave will be. But a six-foot wave could do a hell of a lot of damage in Hawaii. However, they have been alerted. And no . . . they’re hoping that the loss in life will be very low.

All personnel were evacuated from Kodiak and the islands off of Alaska—a six-foot tidal wave hit them. A four-foot tidal wave is . . . will probably hit San Francisco at about 4:30 [EST]—that would be 3:30 our time here—but they are not anticipating too much damage, because they don’t think the force will be too much. It could be, however. It will hit Japan at 6:30 a.m., but to a much lesser degree, and that is not considered too serious.

Apparently the town of Seward, Alaska, which is a small town near Anchorage, is in about the worst shape. It has been severely damaged and is on fire. Valdez, another town near Anchorage, is severely damaged. Anchorage itself—no power and lights. The Presbyterian hospital is damaged so badly that all people were evacuated; they’re now in private houses. And doctors are being flown . . . the commander in chief of the Alaskan forces is flying doctors and the governor [William Egan] to Juneau. And these doctors are going to help with the patients, who are now scattered through houses. And it takes . . . one doctor can’t do as much work as he can in a hospital. The troops are in Valdez, Seward, and Anchorage.

Now, Elmendorf was the one that really, I think, sort of touched off a panic.[note 3] Elmendorf Air Force Base, adjacent to Anchorage and named for Army Air Force test pilot Hugh Elmendorf, was home to the Alaskan Command NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) Region, and the 21st Wing (now the 3rd Wing), 11th Air Force.

President Johnson

That’s the Air Force base, isn’t it?

Reedy

Yes, sir. They initially reported heavy damage to their aircraft, and apparently they just assumed there was heavy damage, because there was severe damage to their buildings.

President Johnson

When did all this come in—about midnight?

Reedy

About then, sir. And the . . . however, there are all sorts ofwild reports on the radio and TV, or radio anyway, most of which seem to be complete nonsense. You might hear something about a six-foot tidal wave hitting Beaumont [Texas]. General [C. W.] Clifton says that he’s been informed that’s impossible. You might hear something about a tidal wave hitting Houston, which General Clifton says is impossible.[note 4] General Chester Clifton was the President’s chief military aide. The Houston rumors appear to have been based on the seismological readings of Jean Claude De Bremaecker at Rice University. Speaking of short-lived shock waves carried in the earth’s crust, and not by sea, Bremaecker estimated that the city of Houston had been lifted 4 inches (and then set down again, gently) by these speedy waves, which were several hundred miles in length. Coupled with Coast Guard reports of unusually large waves (3–5 feet above normal) at Corpus Christi and at the Sabine Pass in the Gulf of Mexico, such readings led ultimately to mistaken reports of “tidal” waves hitting Houston. “Geophysics: Why Anchorage Rocked,” Time, 10 April 1964.

There is some damage, definitely, at Elmendorf, but apparently the fighter planes, which are the interceptors, are in pretty good shape. Most of the damage seems to have been to cargo planes. And according to Clifton’s report, all of the planes are operational. It may be that some things on them are not in too good shape. And the airport . . . the runways, they said, at Elmendorf are usable. However, there is no power or light at the base at all. There is no damage . . . there are no casualties—there’s no deaths—at Elmendorf.

President Johnson

Any anywhere?

Reedy

That’s a subject in dispute. There have been no authenticated casualties in Anchorage as yet. However, UP [United Press] says there are six authenticated casualties and that they may rise [to] 60 to 100. But the military can’t find any as of this point.

Now, what we have done so far is as follows: the OEP [Office of Emergency Planning] has been alerted, and they have an automatic plan that’s supposed to go into action whereby the military moves in with whatever it can. That’s a part of the way they’re moving into Juneau and into some other areas around there. Cy Vance has been alerted.[note 5] Cyrus Vance was the secretary of the Army. He is now the senior secretary [of the armed services], with [Robert] McNamara on vacation. He will probably be calling you sometime in the morning with a complete rundown of what is possible.

I talked to Sylvester and suggested that on some of these more wild things that might spread panic, it would be well if he had someone down in the Pentagon that could put out accurate information, especially on the two things that are causing . . . that I think might cause the greatest panic: one, about the damage to Elmendorf Air Base; and the other is an early report that all of our communications with the military in Alaska were knocked out.[note 6] Elmendorf Air Force Base was the site of the Alaskan NORAD Regional Operations Control Center, one of the three such regional centers in the NORAD system. Now, it turns out that is not true.

President Johnson

[softly] Hmm.

Reedy

There was one report floating around for a while that BMEWS was knocked out and NORAD was knocked out.[note 7] BMEWS is the acronym for the U.S./U.K. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. Clear, Alaska, 80 miles southwest ofFairbanks in Central Alaska, was the site of the Clear Air Station, established in June 1961 as the second of three mechanical radar sites in the BMEWS network that also included similar installations at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland and the Royal Air Base, Fylingdales, United Kingdom. Despite Reedy’s assertion to the contrary, the $360 million Clear BMEWS radar was inoperable for six minutes after the onset of the Good Friday earthquake. “Clear Air Force Station” in Wikipedia (cited 4 March 2004). Available from wikipedia.org/wiki/Clear_Air_Force_ Station. It is not true at all of BMEWS. NORAD, they say one line has been knocked out, but the alternate is working.

Now, what it really amounts to—it is a major disaster. There doesn’t seem to be any question about that. But the authentic information we can get seems to indicate that it’s not quite as catastrophic as the . . . some of these wild reports indicated at first.

The major thing that we have to wait for now that might still put this in very bad shape is what happens when that tidal wave hits Hawaii, and it’s probably hit by this time. It’d be—

President Johnson

Or San Francisco.

Reedy

Yes, San Francisco; however, they are not as concerned about San Francisco.

President Johnson

[sleepily] Now, the next thing I’d do is when I talk to whoever you talk to next, I’d see that they notify [McGeorge] Bundy of everything and ask him to check and see if there’s any instructions that we should get to anyone that haven’t been alerted, if the command in the Pacific or Alaska or any people that haven’t been notified, because that would be the first thing we’d want to know—

Reedy

Right.

President Johnson

—so they could prepare or anticipate any place it might hit, like our people in Japan.

Reedy

Right. Incidentally, the commander in chief of the Pacific is also on the alert, which . . . He would have the major responsibility for Hawaii. That’s Admiral [Harry] Felt.

President Johnson

If you see, whoever . . . Let’s ask Sylvester when we talk to him—let’s don’t call him, but when he calls us—to see that the Pentagon top man talks to Bundy and see if any notification or alert on this, or authority that anybody needs to be given, that they be given it. Right away.

Reedy

Right.

President Johnson

So, let’s don’t wait and try to get a message to somebody that doesn’t come . . . OK. Anything else?

Reedy

I don’t think so, sir. Not unless—

President Johnson

How’d the fellows get along today in Austin?[note 8] This is a reference to the White House press corps camped out at Austin’s Driskill Hotel.

Reedy

I think pretty well, sir. There was a little flak over that trip to Johnson City, but . . .[note 9] Just after noon on the previous day, President Johnson had driven from the LBJ Ranch to Johnson City, where he had visited the site of an old fort and his boyhood home, in which his cousin Ava Johnson Cox now lived.

President Johnson

What’s the matter with that?

Reedy

Just that UP had it and nobody else did.

President Johnson

Well, you’ve got them spying around every place up here. I think you ought to—I don’t know what to do with them.

Reedy

Well, I just told them that . . . well, I’m not . . . that I think the President has a right to move wherever he wishes, and I’m certainly not in any position to dictate how you go because of their desires.

President Johnson

Was there somebody that didn’t want me to ride into Johnson City?

Reedy

No, not a bit. They just wanted to know about it. I think the only thing they get panicky about is the thought that you would be moving out there around the country exposed and something might happen, and that they would be sitting back here and not know about it. I think that’s the only problem, really.

There is one other problem: Do you have any intention of going to that Fredericksburg thing tomorrow night, sir?[note 10] Considered “tomorrow night” due to the early hour in which he spoke, the event to which Reedy referred was actually held that night. Fredericksburg planned to hold ceremonial bonfires, an Easter eve tradition begun by the region’s Native Americans. Wilma Pitchford Hayes, Easter Fires (New York: Coward McCann, 1959).

President Johnson

I don’t, but I want to be free to do it if I decide I want to. I have no thought of doing it now. I’m real sorry that I get away from there, because if you can’t go . . . I can’t go to an adjoining place, or go where I’m working on a house, 11 miles, without somebody having flak, I don’t know . . .

Reedy

It’s nothing to be concerned about, sir. Not at all. I mean, whatever they—

President Johnson

Well, they’re little chickenshits. I saw where they said I was in the area, and that meant I was probably with my big trustee of my fortune. That’s the goddamndest chickenshit thing I ever saw of grown men. All of the East, that’s the stories back in the Washington papers I got yesterday. “A very concerned”—I’d announced that I’d landed in the area, but that meant that I was probably with Judge [A.W.] Moursund, who’s the trustee of my fortune.[note 11] Writing in the New York Times, Tom Wicker noted that Johnson “met and talked with Judge A.W. Moursund, a neighboring rancher who is one of the trustees for the Johnson ranching and business interests.” Wicker, “Johnsons to Pass a Quiet Weekend,” New York Times, 28 March 1964.

[quietly] They’re a pretty bunch of chickenshits. I would tell them that there’s an area of 40 or 50 miles here that includes Cousin Oriole’s and Stonewall, where the post office is, and Johnson City, and my little adjoining places.[note 12] Cousin Oriole Bailey lived less than a mile from the LBJ Ranch. Including the main LBJ Ranch on the Pedernales and the Llano County Haywood ranch property jointly owned with Moursund, the President owned several tracts of Hill Country real estate. Among these were a hunting lodge on the Moursund property in Round Mountain, the 2,600-acre Scharnhorst ranch, and the Lewis ranch, on the west side of Johnson City. And I would like to know that I can leave without calling a press conference. It’s just the same as I do when I go out to dinner in Washington—I don’t call them. And I’m not going to.

Reedy

[Pauses] Well, whenever there’s a little bit of time, I think I can discuss a few steps that might help you to—

President Johnson

[fatigued, rambling a bit] Well, they’ve got these little peepholes with the long-range cameras, and they’re peeping around here. This little UP boy was out here riding up and down in front of the house like a little ass. I’d tell the UP to try to keep the boys in there or we’ll have to move them all out of here. And this [unclear] whether to be concerned about, if there’s somebody that can tell them anything that’s of any moment at all. I don’t know that he gets anything by running up and down the road—the little Austin boy, this little photographer.[note 13] This may be a reference to United Press International Newspictures photographer Roddey Mims, one of the 13 UPI photographers in the White House News Photographers Association in 1964. Mims had first joined WHNPA in 1962 and was a native of Odessa, Texas. See biographical note, The Roddey Mims Collection, Audiovisual Collections, Jimmy Carter Library.

Reedy

Well, I wouldn’t worry about it tonight, sir.

President Johnson

I’m not going to worry much about it.

Reedy

I think there are ways of solving—

President Johnson

I’ll go back in, because they’re just chickenshits. OK.

Reedy

OK, sir.

After the Reedy conversation, the President was able to go back to sleep. Awakened by Marie Fehmer at 9:15 he rose to the news that his press secretary had called back and had requested a conference in order to prepare an official proclamation on an early response to the Alaskan earthquake. After seeing Dr. Burkley about his persistent cold and reading teletypes from McGeorge Bundy that contained suggested messages to the Office of Emergency Planning and to the governor of Alaska, Johnson set up a conference call with Reedy in Austin and Bundy in Washington. At the White House, Bundy was joined by Bill Moyers and Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, the latter of whom was sitting in for an absent Secretary McNamara. The President and his aides deliberated on how to respond to the earthquake and what to say about the mostly unverified rumors that it had spawned, including concerns that it had damaged U.S. early warning installations in central Alaska. Meanwhile, White House Communications officers were working to contact Alaska’s Democratic governor, William Egan, to whom the President was connected immediately after the conclusion of the conference call. Before being transferred to Egan, the President asked Bundy somewhat obliquely how things fared in the rest of the world. Bundy’s reply highlighted New York Times criticism of U.S. policy in Zanzibar and late-breaking developments in Brazil that would lead within a few days to the ouster of Brazilian President João “Jango” Goulart.

In Brazil, the situation had deteriorated quickly since Lincoln Gordon’s visit with President Johnson on the 16th. President Goulart had taken office following the sudden resignation, in August 1961, of Jãnio da Silva Quadros, an erratic leader who had hastily introduced fiscal austerity measures in his brief seven-month tenure.[note 14] These measures were Quadros’s reflexive response to the massive public works projects of the late 1950s (including the construction of the nation’s $600 million capital at Brasilia) and the alarm such projects had produced in the Brazilian investor class. Goulart, Quadros’s vice president and a wealthy rancher from Rio Grande do Sul, then added to the nascent economic erosion by piling on ineffectual socialist decrees and a chaos-inducing political embrace of the nation’s Communist revolutionaries, actions that did little more than incur the unyielding hostility of foreign business and encourage a capital strike at home. During his 31 months in office, the Brazilian inflation rate had tripled and the value of the cruzeiro had dropped by 83 percent. With some plans hatched as early as October 1963, the Brazilian military had decided in March to launch a coup against Goulart’s regime by April 10. Both Gordon and the U.S. military attaché, General Vernon Walters, had offered at least quiet support for this effort. When, in mid-March, Goulart refused to use force against a group of allied Navy and Marine enlisted men who had staged a sit-in strike (giving them weekend passes and full pardons instead), his Navy minister resigned, and enemies in the Brazilian military (led by Army General Artur da Costa e Silva) advanced their plans for a coup to April 1.[note 15] “Brazil: The Spirit of’32,” Time, 3 April 1964, pp. 30–31; “Brazil: Goodbye to Jango,” Time, 10 April 1964, pp. 26–27; Lincoln Gordon Oral History Interview, by Paige Mulhollan, 10 July 1969, Lyndon B. Johnson Library; Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, pp. 200–207. Bundy’s cable on the matter, sent this day to President Johnson, detailed the odd but ultimately fateful resolution of the sit-down strike.

In East Africa the focus was on Zanzibar, the newly independent island nation 25 miles from the Tanganyikan coast, and the issue was as it had been since the beginning of the revolution there in January: how to balance respect for the autonomy and socioeconomic aims of the nation’s revolutionaries, which the administration and several East African leaders viewed as laudable, with the risk that Chinese Communist intervention—already quite extensive—might encourage racial intolerance and the rejection of the region’s penchant for a nonaligned approach. Bundy reminded the President that the administration’s policy had largely acknowledged the desire of nonaligned East African leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, to let the mostly anticolonial revolution run its course. Indeed, within weeks—on April 26—the revolutionary leader of Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, joined with Nyerere of Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.[note 16] On 29 October 1964 it was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania, with Nyerere as its president and Karume as the president of the state of Zanzibar and the first vice president of Tanzania.

Cite as

“Lyndon Johnson and George Reedy on 28 March 1964,” Tape WH6403.17, Citation #2681, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Toward the Great Society, vol. 5, ed. David Shreve and Robert David Johnson] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/9050183

Originally published in

Lyndon B. Johnson: Toward the Great Society, March 9, 1964–April 13, 1964, ed. David Shreve and Robert David Johnson, vol. 5 of The Presidential Recordings (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007).