Yes, sir.

Operator, I had to come to another phone. I was eating dinner, and go ahead and put—

Fine, mm-hmm.

—Mr. [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon on.[note 1] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974.

There you are.

Hello?

Mr. President?

Yes, Dick.

How are you? Did I interrupt your dinner?

That’s all right. [speaking over Nixon] I was eating with some folks, but I came in another room. That’s why I didn’t want to talk [unclear].

Oh, well, that’s too bad.

That’s what—no, it isn’t.

I’m just sitting here with your old friend [Charles G. “Bebe”] Rebozo.[note 2] Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo was a Florida businessman and close friend of Richard Nixon. Sen. George A. Smathers [D–Florida] had introduced them in 1950.

Oh, give him my love. I think he’s one of the [speaking over Nixon] finest persons I ever knew.

Well, when we’ve finished, I want to you to say hello to him.

I’d love to.

He’s a great admirer of yours.

He’s been awfully sweet to me.

Let me say this, that—

I’m glad you’ve got a Rebozo because he [Nixon acknowledges] gave me a lot of comfort when I needed it, a lot.

Right. I had a nice visit with the Vice President [Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.] today.[note 3] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968.

Good.

And [Edmund S.] Muskie. And they went on down to Virgin Islands, and I want you to know how much we appreciated your wire, and also Lady Bird [Johnson]‘s call to [Thelma C.] Pat [Nixon].[note 4] Edmund S. Muskie was a U.S. senator [D–Maine] from January 1959 to May 1980, and Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.‘s running mate in 1968. Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934, and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. Thelma C. “Pat” Nixon was the wife of Richard M. Nixon since 1940; second lady of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; and first lady of the United States from January 1969 to August 1974. [President Johnson acknowledges.] That was awful nice.

Good. [Unclear.]

And then as I understand it, we worked it now that it won’t inconvenience you: we’ll see you at Monday at 1:30 up at the White House.[note 5] For Nixon’s visit to the White House, see “Notes of Meeting,” 11 November 1968, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968: Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969, ed. Kent Sieg (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 7: doc. 211.

That’s good. That’s right.

Good.[note 6] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. Now, getting to the one—the key point: Is there anything I could do before that on this business of South Vietnam? If you want me to do something, you know I’ll do anything, because we’re not going to let these people stop these peace things, if you think I could do something.

Dick, I told [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] last night, I thought it’d be better [to] do it that way than to be calling on the trips.[note 7] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969. See Conversation WH6811-03-13722. I think this: these people are proceeding on the assumption that folks close to you tell them to do nothing till January the 20th.

I get it.[note 8] End of 2021 revisions.

Now, we think—

I know who they’re talking about, too. Is it John [G.] Tower [R–Texas]?[note 9] John G. Tower was a U.S. senator [R–Texas] from June 1961 to January 1985.

Well, he’s one of several. Mrs. [Anna C.] Chennault is very much in there.[note 10] Beijing-born Anna C. Chennault was a prominent Republican fundraiser and member of the China Lobby. At a secret meeting in New York, Chennault had introduced South Vietnamese ambassador Bùi Diễm to John N. Mitchell and Nixon. According to Chennault, Nixon told Ambassador Diễm to “please rely on her [Chennault] from now on as the only contact between myself and your government.” Anna Chennault, The Education of Anna (New York: Times Books, 1980), 175–76. Here, Johnson was making an obscure reference to the China Lobby, the group of American politicians and activists, as well as Chinese Nationalists, who blamed the Truman administration for the Communist takeover of China. President Chiang Kai-shek was overthrown in the Communist revolution and set up a government in Taiwan.

Well, she’s very close to John.

And the embassy is telling the President [Nguyễn Văn Thiệu], and the President is acting on this advice.[note 11] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. He started doing it back about the 18th, following our talk on the conversation on the 16th.[note 12] See Conversation WH6810-04-13547-13548. I had two bad breaks in the month of October. The first one came from the other side. Hanoi felt that because of what [McGeorge “Mac”] Bundy had said—Mac Bundy—[Nixon acknowledges] that—withdraw troops—and what Humphrey had said, that he wouldn’t—[note 13] McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University from 1953 to 1961, and special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs from 1961 to 1966. Bundy, who had been national security adviser when President Johnson had first deployed U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, had made a speech at DePauw University on 12 October 1968, calling for the steady and systematic withdrawal of U.S. forces even in the absence of a truce. The speech broke Bundy’s long silence on the war, dating back to his departure from the White House in February 1966. Homer Bigart, “Bundy Proposes Troop Reduction and Bombing Halt,” New York Times, 13 October 1968.

They could wait.

Well, he just said, “I don’t—I will stop the bombing, period. I don’t mean comma or semicolon.”[note 14] Humphrey had called for a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam in a nationally televised campaign speech on 30 September 1968 and repeated the call two weeks later at Rockhurst College in Kansas City, Missouri, adding, “I said period, not comma or semicolon.” John W. Finney, “Humphrey Taunts Nixon as ‘Chicken,’” New York Times, 16 October 1968. So Hanoi picked up the next day and went home for two weeks. [Nixon attempts to interject.] We had it all wrapped up there and then for the meeting.

Now, I don’t know what will come out of the conference, but that was the way it was. They went off. In the meantime, these messages started coming out from here that Johnson was going to have a bombing pause to try to elect Humphrey and that they ought to hold out because Nixon will not sell you out like the Democrats sold out China, and we have talked to different ones.[note 15] Johnson was referring to intelligence reports from the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The NSA had intercepted a 27 October 1968 cable from South Vietnamese ambassador Bùi Diễm to his government saying, “I [explained discreetly to our partisan friends our] firm attitude [censored] plan to adhere to that position. . . . In accordance with [censored] instruction, [censored] continuing my conversations to try to gain a clear-cut attitude. [Censored] the longer the situation continues, the more [we are] favored, for the elections will take place in a week and President Johnson would probably have difficulties in forcing [censored] hand. [I am] still in contact with the Nixon entourage, which continues to be the favorite despite the uncertainty provoked by the news of an imminent bombing halt. [Censored] informed that if Nixon should be elected, he would first send an unofficial person [censored] and would himself consider later going to Saigon before the inauguration.” "[Censored] Delays Improve South Vietnam’s Position,” 28 October 1968, Director, National Security Agency, to White House, Reference File: Anna Chennault, South Vietnam and U.S. Politics, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. The CIA reported on 26 October 1968, that South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu “sees a definite connection between the moves now underway and President Johnson’s wish to see Vice President Humphrey elected. Thiệu referred many times to the U.S. elections and suggested to his visitors that the current talks are designed to aid Humphrey’s candidacy.” “President Thiệu’s Views Regarding the Issues Involved in Agreeing to a Bombing Halt, 26 October 1968,” CIA to National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Reference File: Anna Chennault, South Vietnam and U.S. Politics, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. I think they’ve been talking to [Spiro T. “Ted”] Agnew.[note 16] Spiro T. “Ted” Agnew was the Republican governor of Maryland from January 1967 to January 1969, and vice president of the United States from January 1969 to October 1973. An FBI wiretap on the South Vietnamese embassy overheard Chennault telling Ambassador Bùi Diễm “that she had received a message from her boss (not further identified) which her boss wanted her to give personally to the ambassador. She said the message was that the ambassador is to ‘hold on, we are gonna win,’ and that her boss also said, ‘Hold on, he understands all of it.’ She repeated that this is the only message. ‘He said please tell your boss to hold on.’ She advised that her boss had just called from New Mexico.” Walt Rostow to Johnson, 2 November 1968, Reference File: Anna Chennault, South Vietnam and U.S. Politics, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. The reference to New Mexico led Johnson and his advisers to wonder whether it referred to Nixon’s running mate, Spiro Agnew, since his campaign plane stopped in Albuquerque that same day. I think they think that they’ve been quoting you indirectly, that the thing they ought to do is to just not show up at any conference and wait until you come into office.

Right. I [unclear]—

Now, they started that, and that’s bad. They’re killing Americans every day. I have that documented. There’s not any question but what that’s happening. Now, I said to you in that last talk that I don’t believe you know it, or you’re responsible for it, and I said—you know, when I talked to all three of you [Nixon acknowledges] that time—but I said, “We have problems.” I looked over that transcript the other night. “We have problems. I think we can work them out. I believe Thiệu will ultimately come, but there are problems.” Now, there are problems because these people are telling them that.[note 17] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

Now, I think the wise thing to do from the standpoint of your country and from the standpoint of your presidency—and I hope you believe me—I—

Oh, I do.

—I want to help you. I want to help you. I don’t want to trick you or deceive you.

Oh, I know that.

I want peace. And I don’t want to get some Democrat in a favorable position over you. But I think they [South Vietnamese] ought to go to that conference. Now—

Let me ask you this: Is there anything we could do right now?

Yes, I think you ought to have whoever you trust the most in Washington, whoever you’re—

[Unclear] to the ambassador?

Yes, sir.[note 18] End of 2021 revisions. Go to the ambassador and say to him, [Nixon attempts to interject] “I am—I told the President when he proposed these three points . . . number one, he assured me that he would not be for a coalition government.”

Right.

“The President has assured me that.”

That’s right.

“The President assured me he’d never recognize the NLF, so I have those assurances from him.”

Right. Right.

“The President’s going to be as strong on this as I am, but the President thinks that if we’re to support South Vietnam through the years ahead, that we must be willing to meet at a conference table.”

Right.

“Now, that’s all we’re asking. Now, you cleared that on the 7th [Nixon acknowledges], and on the 16th, and on the 28th [of October].” At least that’s what the South Vietnamese did. They all cleared it.

Right.[note 19] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

“Therefore, Mr. Ambassador [Bùi Diễm], I think you ought to tell the President [Nguyễn Văn Thiệu] that I support our President on going to the conference, and I think you ought to go. And if they try to sell you out, you don’t have to agree. But you ought to go because the [J. William "Bill"] Fulbrights [D–Arkansas] and the [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfields and [Nixon acknowledges] even the Dirksens will not go along with anybody that won’t go to a conference table."[note 20] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. Now, that’s where they are tonight.

Let me ask you this: About the ambassador, is—I met him about five or six months ago—does he have any influence with that government?[note 21] Here, the question arises as to whether Nixon was probing to find out if Johnson knew about the meeting he had held in New York City with the South Vietnamese ambassador before the election, along with Nixon campaign chairman John N. Mitchell and top Republican fundraiser Anna Chennault. It was then that Nixon had first met Ambassador Diễm. Years later Chennault revealed in her memoirs that after she had introduced the two, Nixon had designated her as his sole contact with the South Vietnamese government. “‘Anna is my good friend,’ [Nixon] said [to Diễm]. ‘She knows all about Asia. I know you also consider her a friend, so please rely on her from now on as the only contact between myself and your government. If you have any message for me, please give it to Anna and she will relay it to me and I will do the same in the future. We know Anna is a good American and a dedicated Republican. We can all rely on her loyalty.’” Anna Chennault, The Education of Anna (New York: Times Books, 1980), 175. Diễm, in his memoirs, gives the date of the New York City meeting as 12 July 1968, and writes: “Finally, Nixon thanked me for my visit and added that his staff would be in touch with me through John Mitchell and Anna Chennault.” Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, In the Jaws of History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 236–37. The National Security Agency intercepted some of Ambassador Diễm’s communications to his home government. If Diễm sent Saigon a report on the key New York City meeting with Nixon, Mitchell, and Chennault, the NSA could potentially have intercepted it the same way. Such a report, if it existed, would have given the Johnson administration evidence that Nixon himself was directly involved in the sabotage of the Paris Peace Talks. There is nothing in the declassified record, however, to indicate the NSA ever made or Johnson ever received such a report. Nixon, however, did not know that.

Yes, he is giving them these signals, and [Nixon acknowledges throughout] he is telling them that he has just talked to New Mexico, and he has just talked to the Nixon people, and they say, “Hold out. Don’t do anything. We’re going to win. We’ll do better by you.”

Now, that’s the story, Dick, and it’s a sordid story. I told you that Sunday when I talked to you.[note 22] See Conversation WH6811-02-13710.

Right.

You remember when I talked to [George A.] Smathers [D–Florida] and Dirksen?[note 23] George A. Smathers was a U.S. senator [D–Florida] from January 1951 to January 1969, and a member of the Finance Committee. See Conversation WH6811-01-13706.

Right.

Now, I don’t want to say that to the country, because that’s not good.

Right.

But they’re playing that game. I don’t think you’re playing it, and I’d get off that hook. I’d just say to them, “You go to that conference, [Nixon acknowledges] and you protect your country. And I’m going to support our President as long as he doesn’t agree to a coalition government, as long as he doesn’t agree to recognize the NLF [National Liberation Front], as long as he stands on the conditions he does, and we’re united. And don’t—”

Right.

“—depend on me to give you a better deal.”

We’ll do that.[note 24] End of 2021 revisions. Now, let me ask you this: Who would be the best one to—who do you think the ambassador—who should I have talk to him? Have you got anybody in mind that—

No, I don’t know—

Could Dirksen do it?

Yeah, I don’t know whether Dirksen has any contact or not. I trust Dirksen. I think Dirksen is—[Nixon attempts to interject] he’s not for any Communist takeover and [at] the same time he’s intelligent.

What I might—well, also, he’s considered to be a . . . why don’t we—let me try this out. Why don’t I get—see if I can get Everett to go over to the ambassador and lay it on the line with them.

That’s what I—

And say that this is—that he speaks for Nixon and Johnson. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Let me say this, Mr. President: that there’s nothing that I want more than to get these people to that table, and, [as a] matter of fact, as I told you on the phone, and I said publicly, I’ll even go out there, if necessary, to get them there. But I don’t think—I think that’d be a grandstand stunt, however, and it would not be the best way. But if you think the ambassador has influence, I’ll have Dirksen talk to the ambassador, or I could do it myself if you think that’ll help.

I think it would help. I’d just call him on the phone say, “I want you to know this. I don’t want your people to get off-key. I’m talking to the President every day.”

Right.

“And the President has assured me he’s not going to do anything”—

Oh, I know that.

—“that we don’t understand. [Nixon acknowledges.] And you tell your President that he better get his people to that conference and get him there quick. And what he does there is a matter for his judgment, but he oughtn’t to refuse to go to a room and meet.”

OK, we’ll work on it.

OK, Dick.

Now, let me ask you this one other thing: tell me about [Richard M. “Dick”] Helm[s].[note 25] Richard M. “Dick” Helms was deputy director for plans at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from February 1962 to April 1965; deputy director of the CIA from April 1965 to June 1966; and director of the CIA from July 1966 to February 1973. Nixon mispronounces Helms’s name as “Helm.” What do you think of Helm? How do you—

I think he’s a career [officer], a former UPI man I never heard of.[note 26] Helms covered the Third Reich in the 1930s as a journalist in the Berlin bureau of the United Press and had interviewed Adolf Hitler. Richard Helms and William Hood, Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 17–26. I appointed an admiral when John [A.] McCone left—[note 27] John A. McCone was a California businessman; chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958 to January 1961; and director of the Central Intelligence Agency from November 1961 to April 1965.

Yeah.

—because I wanted to be sure I didn’t get a patsy or a soft guy in there, and we had too many of them here.[note 28] After John McCone resigned as CIA director in 1965, Johnson replaced him with Admiral William F. Raborn Jr., who held the position for little over a year before Helms took over. The admiral [William F. Raborn Jr.] took it over and this Helms was the deputy.[note 29] Adm. William F. Raborn Jr. was a U.S. naval officer from 1928 to 1965; director of special projects (including development of the Polaris missile) at the Bureau of Weapons from November 1955 to 1962; deputy chief of naval operations for development from 1962 to 1965; and director of the Central Intelligence Agency from April 1965 to June 1966. [Nixon acknowledges.] I consider him—

Let me ask your candid opinion. Would you continue him?

Yes, I would. Yes, I would. If I were you, I’d continue him, and if I were taking over from you, I’d continue him. [Nixon acknowledges throughout.] He’s objective. He’s a reporter. He was an old UPI man. He’s fair. He’s not an advocate. He’s anti—

Oh, I know.

He’s anti-Communist.

Well, when we met him out at the ranch, I was very impressed by him, and I remember [unclear].[note 30] The President had given the Republican nominees a classified briefing at the LBJ Ranch after their convention. Notes on a Briefing of Former Vice President Nixon and Governor Agnew, 10 August 1968, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968: Vietnam, January–August 1968, ed. Kent Sieg (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 6: doc. 327. You feel that way, do you?

Yes. I never heard of him until I appointed him. He was a deputy to this admiral that I had, and he is extremely competent. He’s succinct. He tells you as it is, and he’s loyal. He’s just—

Let me ask you to do this as a personal favor. Would you mind to, you know, I think it would be a nice way to work [the] transition, if you could tell him some time before we meet on Monday that we’ve talked and that, while I don’t want to say it now, that we’re planning to continue him. Would you do that?

Oh, yes. Yes. I’ll be glad to.[note 31] According to Helms’s account, Johnson spoke to him on the subject after the White House meeting with the President-elect. Helms and Hood, Look Over My Shoulder, 376.

[Unclear] because I think it’s good that we have a, you know, a good transition. Now, on this fellow, the ambassador . . . he speaks English pretty well, if I recall.

Yes, yes.

Yeah. Well, we could talk to him. I’ll—I don’t think we ought to do it on the phone, though. Maybe I ought to—but I don’t want him to come down. Maybe I could see him when I come up to Washington. That might be a better thing. And—no, I might get to him before that, though. Maybe Dirksen is the best one to—

I would write out whatever I said, and what I would say—[Dean] Rusk said yesterday [Nixon acknowledges]—and Rusk is the best adviser you can have until you get a man you have that much confidence in.[note 32] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.

[speaking over President Johnson] I know. I have great confidence in him.

He’ll play as fair with you, and I’ll bet my life on it, as he will with me. He’s a good man. Rusk said, “If I were Nixon, I would write out one sentence, and I’d say, ‘I support the President of the United States [Nixon acknowledges] in going to the conference as soon as you can, and thereby—there discussing the problems at issue, and we are united on that.’”

Good.

“Now, the President has given me assurances that he’s not for recognizing the NLF as an independent entity, and he’s not for coalition government. And that’s what you say you want, too, so you go on and talk it over. And if you can settle it, I’ll be the happiest man in the world. If you can’t, when I come in, I’ll assure you that the President will work with me in trying to settle it.”

Actually, if we can get them to talking before that, it’ll be much better, though.

It certainly will because you won’t—

This 60 days is the best time to get the damn thing [unclear].

You won’t have ten men in the Senate support South Vietnam—

Oh, I know.

—when you come in if these folks refuse to go to the conference.

Absolutely. Well, I’ll get on it. As a matter of fact . . . we’ll try to get—I’ll try to get Dirksen on the phone now and see if we can arrange to have this fellow . . . well, I’ll work it out. You don’t need to worry about that. We’ll try to get to him, and . . . I can just put it quite directly that we want him to go to the conference, period. And that you and I “agree completely on what ought to be done.” How’s that?

And I would do it. And I’d say, “We’ll be in touch each day, and”—

Yeah.

—that he can be sure that he can tell his President that “this government’s going to operate as one, before and after.”

Right, right.

And I’m not going to make any decision there that will adversely affect those people without talking to you and without talking to them.

Well, of course, the point is—

I haven’t stayed in this thing five years to throw it [Nixon chuckles slightly] away the last five weeks.

The whole point is, too, that you’ve always—your position has always been basically, as I told you, you’ve taken the position, which was extremely unpopular and which was right, and so therefore I want to support you on it, and we’re going to do it. And there’s no question about that. I want you to know that.

Thank you, Dick, thank you.

And now, if the only difficulty is—now, does Rusk think this ambassador—I don’t know the fellow well enough. I met him in New York about, oh, in April or May, and he’s—

Rusk told me last night that he ought to—Nixon ought to do one of two things. He said, “I’ll go see Nixon if you want me to.”

Yeah.

I said, “I think that will highlight a problem, and there’ll be a lot of press around.”

Right.

“And it’ll embarrass Nixon and embarrass you.” And he said—

So he thinks I should just talk to the ambassador?

He said that we ought to do one of two things. You ought to pick out whoever you’re going to have as Secretary of State or whoever your closest friend is—

[Unclear] have that.

—to go tell him, or you ought to say in writing just two sentences that “I want you to know”—pick up the phone and tell him—“I want you to know that I believe your country ought to go to this conference. It’s going to make it hard for all of us if you don’t.”

Right.

“And the President talked to me about it before we had the conference, and he’s going to talk to me about what happens at the conference, and you don’t need to feel insecure. We’re going to stay with you and be fair, and I can give you that assurance.” And you ought to tell them that they’re going to hurt themselves though, [speaking over Nixon] if Fulbright and Mansfield—Mansfield’s—

Oh, yeah. There’ll be no doubt that the country will not support—

Mansfield’s coming in to me tomorrow to say to them to go straight to hell and go on and negotiate a get-out with Hanoi. That’s what he’s coming—he’s the leader of the Senate.

You can’t do that because—

No.

—we’ve got to—that way you’d leave all those boys out there alone.

I sure can, or I’d pull them out and leave them there alone.

That’s what I mean, yeah.

But if this damn fool just sits back and says—today he says that he wants to go and head the United States delegation and tell us what to do. And under our Constitution, I couldn’t do that.

No, that’s right.

So—

All right—

What he’s doing, Dick, these people—they thought that we were going to trick you and try to pull a bombing halt to defeat you, so their judgment was that they ought to take out insurance and get them to screw the thing up where no good would come. Now, we’re not trying to do that, and I’m not. And I think that American boys are being killed every day. We ought to tell these folks to go to the conference, and we’re going to support South Vietnam after the election just like we did before.

And if they go, then there’s a better chance for them than if they don’t go.

Oh, of course—

—[unclear] it is.

Because otherwise they’ll be deserted. OK.

Of course. All right.

I’ll get on it.

You let me know, now, who you—what you do and what you say [Nixon acknowledges] so I’ll know there.

What time is—

If I were you I’d call him right now, and I’d just say, “I have just talked to the President, period. I want you to know that I think your President should send a delegation there next week, period. I can assure you that I have assurances that this government before and after January the 20th is going to play it straight and fair with you, but you will lose if you don’t get a delegation there and soon, period.” Because Hanoi and NLF are having a propaganda field day. Rusk told me tonight that the great social charm in Paris is the NLF woman [Nguyễn Thị Bình].[note 33] Nguyễn Thị Bình was minister of foreign affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam from June 1969 to July 1976, and a Vietcong representative at the Paris Peace Talks. “Floating in a light cloud of Chanel No. 5, Mrs. Nguyễn Thị Bình, leader of the National Liberation Front (Vietcong) delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, said last night she was optimistic about resolution of the Vietnam conflict.” London Sunday Times; “Vietcong’s Mrs. Bình Optimistic on Talks,” Washington Post, 10 November 1968.

Oh, God, yes. She’s horrible.

And they’re just sitting back and saying that the U.S. can’t even deliver.

Right. That’s right. OK.

And that’s what I’d say to him. There’s nothing dangerous about it—that you’ve said that publicly.

Oh, I believe it, too.

“I support the President. I support the government.” And I’d just say, “Mr. Ambassador, there’s some people raised the question, and I just think you ought to tell your President that I have an agreement with our President that we’re going to act in unison [Nixon acknowledges] just as two partners.”

Right. We’ll do it.

OK.

Bye.