Hello?

Mr. President, Mr. [George P.] Shultz is en route back to his office and I have Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger on.[note 2] George P. Shultz was U.S. secretary of labor from January 1969 to July 1970; director of the Office of Management and Budget from June 1970 to May 1972; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from May 1972 to May 1974. Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Yeah.

There you are.

Mr. President—

Hello, Henry?

Yes, Mr. President.

I just wanted to ask you how’d you get along with Newsweek? Or are you still there?

No, he’s just left. Oh, I got along—[note 3] Kissinger had just met with Henry Hubbard, a congressional correspondent from 1959 to 1985 who also covered the White House for Newsweek magazine, and other journalists from Newsweek.

You shake him?

Oh, yeah. [President Nixon laughs.] Oh, I really gave him hell, and he said, and I believe him . . . he said when it’s in the international section, there’s almost nothing that can be done because [Robert C.] Christopher is practically a pacifist, their foreign affairs editor.[note 4] Robert C. Christopher was foreign affairs editor for Newsweek magazine from 1963 to 1969; executive editor from 1969 to 1972; and editor of the international edition from 1972 to 1977.

Christopher. I see.

While if it’s in the national section, then it’s more balanced, and that is true because the week before they covered Laos in the national section.

I see.

[speaking over President Nixon] And he said, “Well, in any event, don’t worry about it because I have concluded Vietnam has disappeared from the front pages forever.”

He said that?!

[Chuckles.] Yes.

I’ll be damned. They’re, of course, overreacting, aren’t they?

Yes.

You know, isn’t it funny?

But you see—

Henry, you know, we don’t realize—I think China more than Moscow is a goddamned nerve thing for these people. What do you think? I don’t know.

Because it’s so new.

Yeah.

And, of course, there’s—

And, of course, let’s face it, in the long run it’s so historic. You know, when you stop to think of 800 million people and where they’re going to be—Jesus, this is a hell of a move.

Of course, I don’t want to get our hopes up too much, but one of the things that has occurred to me that I did not tell to this fellow [President Nixon acknowledges] is that it is conceivable—indeed it is very possible—that they know Hanoi’s going to make a peace move and they don’t want to be left out.

Mm-hmm. Yeah. Well, that’ll take care of itself. Getting back to the Russian thing, I was concerned about the TASS thing.[note 5] This may refer to an article distributed by the Soviet news agency TASS, written by Georgy Arbatov, a Soviet political scientist well-known in the West as an unofficial spokesman for the Kremlin’s views. Arbatov claimed that Americans, particularly “belligerent Zionist elements,” were rabid haters of the Soviet Union who hoped to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift. In a 14 April news article from Washington, TASS merely reported on developments and quoted from a New York Times editorial to the effect that China had rendered Nixon a service at a time when anti-Vietnam War protesters were preparing for a major demonstration in Washington. I don’t know how—are you concerned that much? Are we . . . let’s—or do we—wait, can you call [Yuli M.] Vorontsov again and—or that would be too far?[note 6] Yuli M. Vorontsov was chargé d’affaires at the Soviety embassy in Washington, D.C., during the 1970s.

No, I think it would make us look too eager, Mr. President.

Well, I don’t want them to think, though, that—you know what I mean? Maybe you should call [Anatoly] Dobrynin.[note 7] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States from January 1962 to May 1986.

No, Mr. President, [President Nixon acknowledges] I’ve called Dobrynin once.

All right.

I’ve had Vorontsov in.

All right.

I’ve called Vorontsov this morning.

Mm-hmm.

And I’ve had [Ronald L.] Ziegler put out a statement—[note 8] Ronald L. Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974. In a press briefing, Ziegler said that the Nixon administration’s actions with regard to China “do not relate” to its policy towards the Soviet Union and that the United States sought to improve relations with both powers. Ziegler commented that “to be a friend of the United States, it does not follow that it is necessary to be an enemy to the Soviet Union.”

Right, that’s enough. OK.

And I think any more would really be overeager.

Yeah. And now at this point, basically TASS is simply—but TASS, that shows that they must be hysterical about this damn thing.

That’s right.

Huh?

That’s right.

[chuckling] Because they said this removed the mask of U.S.-China—shit, we don’t have any relations with the Chinese!

Well, they’re also—

They must think we’re doing something.

Well, they’re also using it against the Chinese.

Oh, how is that?

Well, because one of the things in which the Chinese have been driving them crazy is by claiming they were revolutionary purists while the Russians [President Nixon acknowledges] were opportunists.

I see.

So this is part of their internal problem.

I see. So they’re saying that we are the—that here are the Chinese colluding with the capitalists.

That’s right. I think this was more directed at them.

You know, I would say this: the columnists and the rest, they should have enough to write about for at least two weeks. I don’t say [Kissinger acknowledges] a month, but two weeks—

But, of course, at the end of those two weeks we may have something else to tell them.

Yeah. But just . . . So [Henry] Hubbard thought this was going to take Vietnam out of the play for a while, huh?

For a year!

Really?

Yes.

He must be quite emotional about it.

Oh, God, and he—well, I have to say in his defense, he is more intelligent than the Time people.

He’s somewhat decent, yeah.

And he’s really quite decent, and—

And [Simmons] Fentress is a snake.[note 9] Simmons Fentress was a political correspondent for Time magazine from 1961 to 1981.

Yeah, I know. I said to him, “Look, if you want to write an interesting story here, don’t write it as if Zhou Enlai woke up one morning and decided [President Nixon acknowledges] he’s going to have good relations.”[note 10] Zhou Enlai was premier of the People’s Republic of China from October 1949 to January 1976.

Good God.

“Write it in terms of a man who’s been thinking along this line since ‘67 and who carefully, deliberately moved in that direction.”

That’s right. And, incidentally, I hope you’ve mentioned the fact no Democrat could have done it.

Oh, yes, I told him.

And the fact that here I have done it because, frankly, the hawks trust me.

And also—

Have you made that point to a few?

Oh, yes. And I said also, it is a success of your speech and of your general policy.[note 11] On 7 April 1971, Nixon delivered a nationally televised speech announcing the withdrawal of 100,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam by 1 December 1971. The President argued against proposed legislation to force him to bring the last of the troops home by the end of 1971. Secretly, he had decided to complete the withdrawal sometime between July 1972 and January 1973, a range of dates chosen to ensure that South Vietnam would not fall before Election Day 1972 (Conversation 456-005, 23 February 1971, 10:05–11:30 a.m., Oval Office; Conversation 465-008, 10 March 1971, 10:42 a.m.–1:15 p.m., Oval Office; Conversation 466-012, 11 March 1971, 4:00–4:55 p.m., Oval Office; Conversation 471-002, 19 March 1971, 7:03–7:27 p.m., Oval Office; Conversation 476-007, 9 April 1971, 8:52–9:58 a.m., Oval Office). If they thought you were on the verge of collapsing, they couldn’t do it.

Right.

And I—also, I said, too—he remembered that during the campaign you had talked along this line, too.

That’s right. Mm-hmm.

And—oh, I—

Well, also to Howard K. Smith after the July broadcast, do you recall?[note 12] Howard K. Smith was a television news journalist, and co-anchor of the ABC Evening News from 1969 to 1975. When I—that we did in—with the four network commentators in California, afterwards I talked about China a bit.[note 13] On 1 July 1971, Nixon held a nationally televised discussion with the news anchors of the major networks. Smith was an ABC television news anchor who later quoted Nixon as saying in private conversation that he favored regular diplomatic relations with the PRC.

Well, I had clippings, Mr. President, of all the things you’ve said at news conferences, and so forth, since you’ve come in here.

Yeah.

And also of what you said at toasts, to [Nicolae] Ceauşescu and [Josip Broz] Tito.[note 14] Nicolae Ceauşescu was president of the state council of Romania from December 1967 to March 1974, and president of Romania from March 1974 to December 1989. Josip Broz Tito was president of Yugoslavia from January 1953 to May 1980. In state visits to Romania and Yugoslavia, Nixon had dropped broad public hints of his willingness to engage with China. During a toast to President Ceauşescu in August 1969, Nixon had employed the term “People’s Republic of China,” the first use of China’s official name by a U.S. president. Nixon did not refer directly to China in his toast to President Tito in October 1971, but he stressed that, despite differences in government, they shared common goals, including peace in the world and the right of each nation and people to choose its own form of government without outside interference.

Right.

And I sort of said, “You know, you can assume that he probably said more privately than he said at the toasts.”

Right. [Chuckles.]

And—[chuckles] which is putting it mildly.

Right.

And—no, he is . . .

Do you think he wants us to lose?

No, no. Hubbard wants us to win.

Really?

Yeah.

What—he’s changed then. He didn’t want us to win at the beginning. Maybe he’s one convert then. Why does he want us to win? Because he was really against us a year ago.

Yeah, but I think he’s really developed a lot of respect for us.

Do you really?

Absolutely. I don’t say this about Fentress.

No, no. Oh, Fentress is a snake. And I know, he’s always been a snake.

But I’d say it about him.

Very interesting.

And—

Why does he want us to win?

Well, I think he likes the fact that you’ve stuck to your guns, and he’s developed a grudging respect. You’re an acquired taste for him. But that’s my impression of him. He’s been very positive, and he sees the danger of the right wing. [President Nixon acknowledges.] I sort of—I hinted at some—I said, “Look, if Vietnam ever breaks, and I’m not saying it will, it will break as suddenly as this one did. And so don’t put yourself in a position—"

Do you really believe that?

I happen to believe that, Mr. President, yes. I will say, though—

What makes you think that Vietnam would break suddenly? I just don’t see that it will.

Because this is the Asian way of negotiating. We negotiate after there’s an agreement that we should move and then we gradually compromise along the way. The Vietnamese act . . . that the major negotiation is before the negotiation starts. That is, they want to be sure they’ve squeezed the maximum out of the situation that they can unilaterally.

Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Once they’re sure of that, then they will move to their new position.

Mm-hmm.

But they don’t see any sense in approaching their position in stages.

I see.

If I had to predict, Mr. President, I would think there is a better than even chance now that in the next three months something will break . . . in Paris.

Even in Paris, huh?

Yeah.

[Pause.] Well . . . if it does, we—be ready. The main thing, I think, your fear is well-justified. I wish we—you could see them before they move. [speaking over Kissinger] In other words, make our move. I almost think your trip—

[speaking over President Nixon] I would—I think we should send a message to them by the end of next week no matter what we hear from Dobrynin.

Oh, hell, yes. Yes. Yeah, look, whatever Dobrynin does, you got to move on this front.

Right.

Yeah, because the Chinese worry them, too.

That’s right. No, no, I will propose a meeting to them probably next Wednesday [President Nixon acknowledges] for two weeks from now. They need two weeks to get ready for it.

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Well, say one thing, we really got the liberals worried.

Well, Mr. President—

They are worried.

—if you hadn’t stuck to your guns you wouldn’t be worth dealing with.

Yeah, if—you know, it’s a funny thing. They don’t, they—none of them will admit it, but the April 7th speech was the key to this whole thing, wasn’t it? [speaking over Kissinger] Or was it? I don’t know. I think the April 7th—

Mr. President, if you had given a deadline, if you had acted like the man on the verge of [unclear] out of Vietnam, you would literally not have been worth dealing with for them.

But on April 7th they watched that speech, I’m sure, and they saw—

They saw you’re a tough nut to crack and they have two more years of war.

[speaking over Kissinger] And I said, “All right, I’m going to stick it out, and I don’t give a damn what anybody says.”

That’s right.

And that has some effect.

They knew they’d be in it until ‘73, and that’s too late for them vis-à-vis the Russians.

Well . . . the [Robert D.] Murphy thing you worked out—you talked to him a little bit more?[note 15] Robert D. Murphy, a retired senior U.S. diplomat, was being sent to Taiwan to reassure the Nationalist Chinese government that the U.S. effort to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China would not fundamentally endanger the American commitment to security of the island or to its basic interests. Murphy was U.S. ambassador to Belgium from November 1949 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Japan from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from July 1953 to November 1953; and U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from August 1959 to December 1959.

Right, and I’m giving him some papers tomorrow, Mr. President.

Right. Well, he’s just the right man. He’ll do a good job. [Kissinger acknowledges.] He’ll protect us with State, and let him tell old [Marshall] Green that he’s going, but, you know, all that sort of thing.[note 16] Marshall Green was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from June 1965 to March 1969; assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969 to May 1973; and U.S. ambassador to Australia from 1973 to 1975.

No, we’ve got it all set.

Good, OK.

Good, Mr. President.