Hello?

Mr. [Henry A.] Kissinger, sir.[note 3] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977. There you are.

Well, you all—

Mr. President?

—all ready for your trip?

I’m getting ready. I just got home from the office a little while ago [President Nixon acknowledges] and getting things together.

Well—

I’ll look in on you in the morning before I go away. I won’t leave actually till 10, 10:30 [unclear].

Well . . . [unclear]. [Chuckles.]

Well, I wouldn’t be very conciliatory with [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana].[note 4] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977.

I’m not going to be a goddamn bit conciliatory [unclear] on this. I’m going to say, “Now, Mike, you should know that there are things going on here. We just hope this is not going to give the enemy the wrong impression.”

I would say so because what these people have done is unconscionable. One looks at the combination of [Clark M.] Clifford, the [Pentagon] Papers, and now this.[note 5] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from February 1968 to January 1969. Clifford had recently stated that the administration could negotiate the release of the POWs in 30 days and an end to America’s involvement in Vietnam by the end of 1971. On 13 June 1971, the New York Times had begun publishing a series of articles based on a classified Defense Department history of the Vietnam War. It is unforgivable, because everyone who wanted to make a record had a chance to do it upon McGovern–Hatfield.[note 6] Kissinger refers to an amendment sponsored by Sen. George S. McGovern [D–South Dakota] and Sen. Mark O. Hatfield [R–Oregon] that would require the President to bring the troops home by the end of 1971. So they had their chance at it, and if it had stopped at that point we would have been in good shape.

Well, we played it the best way we could. [Unclear]—

We had no choice, I mean we—

It doesn’t tie us [unclear]. If it’s misinterpreted it’ll hurt the negotiations. [Unclear.]

That’s right. But I’m beginning to wonder whether as a basic strategy, at least from the way the foreign policy side looks to me, Mr. President, we had them on their knees last October, and whatever it was that didn’t get us all the votes was—I think it had more to do with the economy.[note 7] President Nixon had made a speech in October 1970 that proposed a cease-fire in place in Vietnam as a first step before starting an Indochina Peace Conference. “Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia,” 7 October 1970, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), doc. 335. In the November 1970 midterm elections, the President’s party lost seats in the House of Representatives. Here, Kissinger attributes that loss to the economy.

Oh, it did, yes.

More than anything else. And then we let them off the hook.

Yep. Well, we’ll have more—

But we can still—

We’ll have more—

We still have the big hole card.[note 8] Nixon and Kissinger used the “hole card” metaphor frequently. Here Kissinger probably refers to his upcoming secret trip to China to prepare for a public visit by the President in 1972.

We’ll have them on their knees again.

Yeah. [Unclear.]

Yeah, I think from now on we’re not going to consult with them. And won’t tell them a damn thing and just do it.

Exactly.

We’re not going to give credit [unclear]—

And . . . but we have to start hollering “treason” a little bit.

Yeah, I guess so. Oh, I think so. I think so. I—when I think—you say, “we,” I really can’t do it.

No, no, but [Spiro T.] Agnew could do it.[note 9] Spiro T. Agnew was vice president of the United States from January 1969 to October 1973. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And some of our people could do it, and then they’d have to defend themselves.

I wonder if Agnew shouldn’t say something about that on Friday [unclear] speech. [Unclear.]

I think it’d be a good occasion.

[Unclear.]

I think he should give a ripsnorter of a speech pointing out what happened this month.[note 10] In a 25 June 1971 speech, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew assailed legislative efforts to end the war, but stopped short of describing those as treason. UPI, “Agnew Defends Nixon Policies Against Critics of the War,” Chicago Tribune, 26 June 1971. [Long pause.] [President Nixon acknowledges.] [Patrick J.] Buchanan could probably do it.

In the morning, why don’t you tell Buchanan what you think he ought to include in that respect. He’s making a speech on Vietnam to the Young Republicans’ convention. And it’s just as good a place as any.

I think so.

It doesn’t make any difference what the forum is. [speaking over Kissinger] [Unclear] just lays it out there.

I think so, Mr. President. Of course, they have a desire to lose. They couldn’t bear the thought that we bring this—they’re not so worried about our getting out. They’re worried about our getting out without Saigon going Communist.

[Chuckles.] Yeah. They’re afraid it—they want us to get out and have it go Communist, though.

Oh, yes. Absolutely.

Mainly because they want us to fail.

Because that means you have failed, and they can say they would have done it faster.

Doing their best.

Well, except these [Pentagon] Papers are not helping them, Mr. President.

I don’t think they are, either.

I don’t know—and, in fact, our making such a tough fight helps us.[note 11] The Nixon administration tried to obtain court orders blocking the publication of the Pentagon Papers. On 30 June 1971, the Supreme Court would rule against this attempt to exercise prior restraint on the press.

What?

Our public relations people don’t like the fight we’re making, but our making it makes it clear that we’re not behind these revelations. I mean, even [John F.] Kennedy is getting tarred now.[note 12] John F. Kennedy was president of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963. [President Nixon acknowledges.] I mean, these were the great Kennedy people who did all of this.

Yeah, I know.

Even in the Mc—in the [Lyndon] Johnson administration—those were all Kennedy appointees.[note 13] Lyndon Johnson was vice president of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963, and president of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969.

Sure. [Pause.] Yeah, as it goes along, they’re going to get pretty well knocked, smeared up with this thing.

Well, and it’s coming out anyway, bit by bit, over our opposition. [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] I mean, the Globe papers—the Boston Globe papers now have the first direct slap at Kennedy.[note 14] The Boston Globe had published articles based on the Pentagon Papers’ chapters on the Kennedy administration. [Paul M. “Pete”] McCloskey [R–California] is now saying that [Henry Cabot] Lodge [Jr.] contributed to the assassination of [Ngô Đinh] Diệm on Kennedy’s orders.[note 15] Kissinger exaggerates. Rep. Paul N. “Pete” McCloskey said that the Pentagon Papers indicated that the United States “encouraged and authorized” the overthrow of South Vietnamese president Ngô Đinh Diệm in 1963. Spencer Rich, “McCloskey Says Documents Show U.S. ‘Encouraged’ Ouster of Diệm,” Washington Post, 22 June 1971. Paul N. “Pete” McCloskey was a U.S. representative [R–California] from December 1967 to January 1983. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 1960; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from August 1963 to June 1964 and August 1965 to April 1967; and U.S. ambassador to West Germany from May 1968 to January 1969. Ngô Đinh Diệm was president of South Vietnam from October 1955 to November 1963.

[chuckling] McCloskey is?

Oh, yeah.

Well, that’s nice.

So McCloskey is screaming with—[on] the one hand, the Americans pretended to be his friend; on the other they were killing him, which happens to be true.

Yeah. Let him say it. That’s a good one to say it.

And it’s now coming out from the sort of—if we said it, they’d accuse us of smear. [President Nixon acknowledges.] But it’s now coming out from the right people.

The peaceniks, right.

The peaceniks, and it’s coming out over our violent opposition.

It’s turned then. I agree. I think . . . I’m inclined to think we’re [unclear]. And [in] any event, this is one of those things where you’re just glad the—just a totally irresponsible—let me say, make your play. It may still work.

Yes, sir.

Play it hard. Play it hard.

Mr. President, I’m absolutely cold about this. [President Nixon acknowledges throughout.] We’ll play it hard. You’ve suffered this thing to this point, and you’re—we’re going to . . . and then we’ve got the other one, which is only two weeks away.[note 16] Kissinger is referring to his upcoming secret trip to China to prepare for a later public visit by the President. And then when I come out to San Clemente on the 12th, we’ll know where the cards are.

Yes, sir.

By that time we’ll have heard from our other pals [President Nixon acknowledges] and then we’ve got our cards and [unclear]—

Know which we have and which we haven’t.

We’ll know which we have, which we haven’t, what we can say, what we can’t say. And then we’ve got another two months to play them [unclear].

OK, Henry. Fine.

[Unclear], Mr. President.