Transcript
Edited by Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes, with Kieran K. Matthews and Marc J. Selverstone
On 9 February 1968, the White House made an announcement that was meant to be reassuring: The Joint Chiefs of Staff had never requested the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. Sen. Eugene J. “Gene” McCarthy [DFL–Minnesota], a Democratic presidential candidate, had recently claimed that “there have been some demands already” for nuclear weapons, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had asked the State Department whether any tactical nuclear weapons were then in Vietnam.[note 1] George C. Wilson, “No A-Arms Asked, Says White House,” Washington Post, 10 February 1968.
Three of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s science advisers—Isidor I. Rabi, James R. Killian Jr., and George B. Kistiakowsky—subsequently wrote to the former president warning of the dangers of using nuclear weapons in Vietnam and urging him to contact President Johnson.
In this call, Johnson told Eisenhower that the United States had no nuclear weapons in South Vietnam and that tactical nuclear weapons would not be effective there anyway.
[reading aloud] "—vantageous to us could lead to general nuclear war. In addition, our use of such weapons will do irreparable damage to our international position, including progress of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to domestic tranquility.[note 2] Diplomats from the United States and the Soviet Union signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 1 July 1968. We respectfully recommend that you urge on the administration such military policies in Vietnam as to make the use of nuclear weapons assuredly unnecessary. If you wish, any one of us would happily come to present detailed considerations.”
Well, I have never heard myself any notice from anybody in your administration that has even suggested this.[note 3] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.
General, let me explain to you what happened: This is a part of the [J. William “Bill”] Fulbright [D–Arkansas], pacifist, isolationist stuff, but it has misled a lot of people.[note 4] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. They sent—we have a barrier out there [in Vietnam] [Eisenhower acknowledges throughout] where we have these electronic things in the trees, and when people go under them, they give a sound, and they notify our planes, and our planes can go in there and hit them, and it’s working out very good.[note 5] End of 2021 revisions. It also—they have a unit about the size of your fist that they step on and it blows them up. Kind of a mine effect. And it’s been very helpful to us in these infiltrations. The Thailand group asked that we send—the Air Force at Thailand—that we send four of our barrier people out there to check up on these results. It’s been working out far better than we expect.[note 6] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. And has nothing whatever to do with anything nuclear. The—[William C.] Westmoreland asked that he be given authority to put some of these, what you’d call a "mine."[note 7] Gen. William C. Westmoreland, often referred to as “Westy,” was commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, and chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972. It’s a—when you touch it, it looks very much like the earth. It’s about the size of your fist, may look like a mushroom or something. You step on it, and it blows them up. Well, as a result, they quit coming that way when you scatter them around. So he wanted to build a circle around Khe Sanh with this what they call “gravel.”
Mm-hmm.
These scientists were sent out. Well, one scientist at some university, [Eisenhower acknowledges throughout] evidently where Professor Brown, we’ll say, was going, who had worked on this barrier—nothing to do with nuclear—he told his wife, and his wife told her sister or something, and anyway, one of these peaceniks got ahold of it. So they called Fulbright’s staff member.[note 8] End of 2021 revisions. He has some very questionable staff members. They refuse to fill out the form to get a Q clearance. And they’re bad people. We can’t prove it, but we just are worried about them.[note 9] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. They got the telephone call. So they called in the New York Times, then, [Eisenhower acknowledges] and said, “Johnson’s group has sent a big crowd out to deploy nuclear weapons.” So they put it in all the papers.[note 10] End of 2021 revisions. So [Eugene J. “Gene”] McCarthy [D–Minnesota] then jumped on it up at Harvard, and McCarthy said that he has information that it’s already been recommended.[note 11] Eugene J. “Gene” McCarthy was a U.S. representative [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to January 1959, and a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1959 to January 1971. So then it comes to the White House. And when it does, [George E.] Christian [Jr.] looks at it, and goes into it with [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara and with [Dean] Rusk.[note 12] George E. Christian Jr. was White House press secretary from February 1967 to January 1969. Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.[note 13] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. And in the meantime, Fulbright’s written Rusk a long letter that says, “We want you to explain if you are doing this.” "Have you quit beating your wife?" That type of letter. So [George E.] Christian [Jr.], the press secretary, same as your [James C. “Jim”] Hagerty, said, "First, they have never recommended anything like this to the President."[note 14] James C. “Jim” Hagerty was White House press secretary from January 1953 to January 1961, and vice president of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) from 1961 to 1975.
No.
"Second, the President would have to be the one that would make the decision. It’s never come to him, and you’re not doing your country any good by publicizing all over the world—”
That’s right.
"—that we’re considering doing something, which has never been considered."
[Unclear.]
So that kind of put an end to it. Then Time comes along and said, “Well, Johnson said that”—I said—“‘In seven years that I’ve been in the Executive Branch, I am not aware that anybody has ever made a recommendation to use nuclear weapons.’”
Now, I know in the four years I’ve been president, nobody has ever recommended it. But as vice president, I sat in on most of the meetings, and I knew, to my knowledge, it hadn’t there. So they say this week, “Well, Johnson said he was not aware, but that implied that he might not have heard it.” So you just can’t hardly knock it down.
Now, the truth of the business is: we have no nuclear weapons in South Vietnam. The people out there do not think the Khe Sanh area—that the tactical nuclear weapons are suitable.
No.
But we—needless to say, the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] have never made a study, never made a recommendation, never come to the President, and so forth.[note 15] End of 2021 revisions. But what got it off was four scientists did go to look at the barrier, and one of them had had some experience in nuclear weapons.
Right. Matter of fact, Mr. President, I was perfectly certain of the answer, [President Johnson chuckles] but [unclear] because of my respect of these three men, who then—who, now if they’ve gotten all worried and sending me a wire this morning—
That’s right.
—and it’s a wire of [chuckling] several hundred words.
If I could I thought I’d get—then we’d get General [Andrew J.] Goodpaster to go see one of them.[note 16] Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster was White House staff secretary from October 1954 to January 1961; NATO supreme allied commander in Europe from July 1969 to December 1974; and commander in chief of the U.S. European Command from May 1969 to December 1974.
Well, I’ll tell you, that would be very fine. I think probably Goodpaster may be in Puerto Rico. He was going to take a va—he’s going to take a short leave.
Well, I’ll get [Earle G.] Bus Wheeler, or somebody, to call.[note 17] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970.
Well, I’ll tell you what I’ll do. I’ll call [James R.] Killian [Jr.] or—[note 18] James R. Killian Jr. was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1948 to 1959; special assistant to the president for science and technology from 1957 to 1959; and chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from January 1956 to March 1958 and May 1961 to April 1963.
Yeah.
—[George B.] Kistiakowsky or [Isidor I.] Rabi, any one of them—[note 19] George B. Kistiakowsky was a physical chemistry professor at Harvard University from 1930 to 1972; a consultant for the Manhattan Project; a member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1959 and chair in 1959; director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy from 1959 to 1961; and chair of the National Academy of Science’s Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy from 1962 to 1965 and vice president from 1965 to 1973. Isidor I. Rabi was a Nobel Prize–winning physicist and Columbia University professor who worked on the Manhattan Project; developed the technology for magnetic resonance imaging; was a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission and chair from 1952 to 1956; and served as science adviser during the Eisenhower administration.
You just call them and just say that you talked to the President. No recommendation’s ever been made, that it got out through Fulbright because four men going to work on the barrier, one or two of them had some nuclear background. There’s not anything to it. It’s never come up, but if any of them are interested in exploring it, I’ll have Mr. [Glenn T.] Seaborg go see them.[note 20] Glenn T. Seaborg was a physicist; chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 1971; and the recipient, along with Edwin McMillan, of the 1951 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Or I’ll have General Goodpaster, or I’ll have the Deputy Secretary of Defense, anybody they’d like to talk to, or I’ll be glad to see them myself.
Thank you very much.
I’m very appreciative to Dr. Killian for—he’s working with Milton [S. Eisenhower] on this.[note 21] Milton S. Eisenhower was president of Johns Hopkins University from July 1956 to June 1967 and March 1971 to January 1972; director of the Critical Issues Council of the Republican Citizens’ Committee; an adviser in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations; and brother of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Johnson had appointed Killian and Milton Eisenhower to the board of directors of the newly formed Corporation for Public Broadcasting. [Eisenhower acknowledges.] And Kistiakowsky, I think, has worked with us on the barrier.
Oh, yes. Oh, Kistiakowsky is a—he’s really a top—matter of fact, all of these—matter of fact, Rabi is a Nobel Prize–winner, and Kistiakowsky is, I think, and Killian, of course, you know him. And so they’re—these are very—the reason I called you, Mr. President, is because I admire—respect for them [President Johnson acknowledges] and I want to disabuse their minds.
That’s right. Well, now, you know, they always—they have these planning things in NATO and every place, but there’s nobody planning or nobody got an order in or a recommendation there, and what I have heard of it, [Eisenhower acknowledges throughout] after this came up, one of the generals, I don’t know whether it was Wheeler or somebody, they said that the hillsides—that this tactical nuclear stuff would be inappropriate for Khe Sanh anyway.
Well, I’m sure of that because who—where’s friend and where’s foe?
[laughing] That’s right! That’s right!
Yes, sir.
Well, I had to—I haven’t had a more pleasant day since I’ve been here than I had yesterday, and I was just telling Lady Bird [Johnson] about how pretty Mrs. [Mamie D.] Eisenhower looked and how fruitful my visit was.[note 22] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934, and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. Mamie G. D. Eisenhower was the wife of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and first lady of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961.
[chuckling] Well, you—just tell her Mamie’s only regret was that she wanted to give you tea or some equivalent.[note 23] President Johnson and Lady Bird had visited with former president Eisenhower and his wife Mamie on 18 February at the Eisenhowers’ home in Palm Desert, California. According to the Presidential Daily Diary, Johnson gave Mrs. Eisenhower an Accutron Boudoir Clock and Gen. Eisenhower buttons with the presidential seal. The two men played golf at the Seven Lakes Country Club, and on Hole 13, Eisenhower shared a story of recently hitting a hole-in-one there.
[laughing] Well, I’m a little embarrassed that you beat me on 15 of the 18, but I guess that’s what I have to expect.
[Chuckles.] OK.
Good-bye.
Bye.
Cite as
“Lyndon B. Johnson and Dwight D. Eisenhower on 19 February 1968,” Conversation WH6802-02-12722-12723, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Johnson Telephone Tapes: 1968, ed. Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4005950