—that it’s been reasonably handled by the press. I don’t anticipate any serious trouble in the near future, although I think they’ll con—[J. William “Bill”] Fulbright [D–Arkansas] and [Albert A. “Al”] Gore [Sr.] [D–Tennessee], in particular, will continue to try to mislead the people as to what actually happened.[note 1] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. Albert A. “Al” Gore Sr. was a U.S. representative [D–Tennessee] from January 1939 to January 1953; a U.S. senator [D–Tennessee] from January 1953 to January 1971; and a member of the Senate Finance Committee. Gore, in particular, was violent in his criticism of the whole affair. But, for the minute, the debate is stilled, I think. Unless you feel we ought to be doing something more, I’m just going to let the matter drop for awhile.

Sure. I’d try to prepare Dean [Rusk].[note 2] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. I’ve got that thing worked out, I think, with a minimum damage. I think he’ll have to have five or ten minutes with each senator. They will establish that rule, and then if he just says he wants to talk about that in the executive session, I think he can get rid of anything that’s interesting or dynamite, and maybe the TV won’t play it up much. What is Gore’s basis? Does he have one thing that he hangs it onto [McNamara attempts to interject] besides he’s just intemperate?

No, I—he’s just intemperate, and I think his real objective is to disassociate himself from any responsibility for everything that’s followed, which, of course, is Fulbright’s as well. And they want to prove that they were misled, and had they known at the time the facts of the Tonkin Gulf situation, they never would have supported the resolution, and hence, would not, in any way, be responsible for the escalation in military operations out there that has occurred since then. [President Johnson acknowledges.] And if he can’t hang it on one thing, and you destroy the case on that, he pops up two or three places elsewhere with different arguments.

Now, what is the accuracy of [Eugene J. “Gene”] McCarthy’s [DFL–Minnesota] statement that’s quoted all last night on television that we invaded the territorial wa[ters]—[note 3] Eugene J. “Gene” McCarthy was a U.S. representative [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to January 1959, and a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1959 to January 1971.

Absolutely false, Mr. President! That’s why I—that was a good thing to hang the release of my statement on because my statement covers that point very, very clearly and precisely. And at the time that we were in the gulf, in August ‘64, North Vietnam had not claimed territorial waters beyond three miles. Neither then, nor now, do we recognize territorial waters beyond three miles. Nor have other Communist nations, in certain cases, claimed beyond three miles. And it’s not right to say we should have expected that they would claim beyond three miles. Cuba, Poland, Yugoslavia, if I recall, claim less than 12 miles. On the 1st of September 1964, two or three weeks after the Tonkin Gulf incident, North Vietnam, for the first time that we’ve been able to find, claimed beyond three miles. They claimed 12 miles.[note 4] Despite McNamara’s apparent certainty, a 3 August 1964 tape indicates that President Johnson recognized that North Vietnam claimed its territorial waters extended 12 miles off its shore: “We [were] within their 12-mile [territorial waters] limit, and that’s a matter that hasn’t been settled.” All of this was very clearly laid out in my statement.

McCarthy came in after the beginning of the hearing. He didn’t read the statement. He didn’t listen to the testimony. He had no basis whatsoever for making that statement. After lunch, when I went—when I left you and went back, and I told the committee that I had instructed the Pentagon to release my statement because of the statement that one of the members of the committee had made, in UPI 109, a copy of which I had with me, they were shocked at what McCarthy had said.[note 5] United Press International (UPI) is an international news service. McNamara is referring to a UPI story that quoted McCarthy.

Mm-hmm.

And now that—his statement isn’t running this morning because, of course, the release of our statement that killed it. Then Fulbright got mad as hell later in the day at the fact that I had released my statement, and they didn’t have anything to rebut it or counter it with. And he tried to poison the press last night, and did get to some of them—

Mm-hmm.

—being very critical of my having unilaterally released a statement. But I think we got good press coverage. The wires last night were full of it, and the [Washington] Post and the [New York] Times and the [Baltimore] Sun this morning give it good play.

I would make a point to be sure with your—some friend of yours on the Post and the Times, too, that you were forced to this when a man comes out, starts quoting parts of your testimony, and you had no alternative after that. And then you don’t want to get mixed up in a campaign, one way or the other, either. And—

I did get the Post to run that specific statement. [President Johnson acknowledges.] It runs at the end of Warren Unna’s article—news article.[note 6] McNamara is referring to Warren Unna, “McNamara Is Rebuked by Fulbright,” Washington Post, 22 February 1968.

Yeah, good. That’s good. That’s what’s going to do it. To get—

And I sold it to the Times, but they didn’t run it.

Mm-hmm. That’s good. OK. That’s fine. You got any feeling on this U Thant conference?[note 7] U Thant was secretary-general of the United Nations from November 1961 to December 1971. He was scheduled to brief LBJ this day on his efforts to start negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam. Have you been following the cables and his visits around to Great Britain and—

Yeah. And I just don’t have any feeling on it, Mr. President. I—yesterday and the day before, I just didn’t spend any time on anything but this thing, and I just—I don’t have any suggestion to you. [President Johnson acknowledges.] I don’t know what Dean and you agreed to in the way of a communiqué. I heard him mention it yesterday.

It just says nothing, that we had a friendly visit, and we assured him of our desire for peace, and he assured us of his continued—

Frankly, that’s all I would do. I’d get it off my calendar [President Johnson acknowledges] as fast as I could, and just be pleasant, and leave no bad taste if you can. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Not pay any attention to it.

One other point, if I may mention it very quickly. [Earle G.] Bus Wheeler doesn’t look very well.[note 8] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. You know, he had that heart attack [President Johnson acknowledges throughout] about eight months ago. He’s just gone through a hell of a period here with me on three committees of testimony. He worked—he’s been working Sundays the last three weeks. If I understood you correctly yesterday, you plan to be in Austin Tuesday morning, next week. If I were—I would suggest that neither you nor he try to get back here for meetings on Tuesday, that he come in Wednesday morning. This has two advantages from his point of view, Mr. President: One, it’ll give him a little more time to be a little more leisurely with [William C.] Westmoreland.[note 9] Gen. William C. Westmoreland, often referred to as “Westy,” was commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, and chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972.

—mother’s out there in Thailand, has been for some time. He hasn’t seen her. He really ought to spend a couple hours with her—

Sure, I’d rather—

—and, three, it’ll give him a few hours of rest.

Sure. I would insist on that. You betcha. He’s going in one of our planes [McNamara acknowledges] where he can be comfortable, isn’t he?

Yes. But it’s a tough trip.

Oh—

It’ll be tough emotionally for him, out there, too. It’s—he’s stepping into a can of worms. And so, on that basis, I’ll tell him to be back Wednesday morning.

Sure. That’s good.

Thank you.

Thank you, Bob.

Thank you.