Hello?

Oh. Ready, Mr. President. There you are.

George?

Yes, sir.

I tried to reach you, but they said that you were out. I thought I’d better talk back through you, although I would be glad to talk to our friend [Richard M. “Dick” Nixon].[note 1] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974. But the—our man [Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.] might not understand that he had called me.[note 2] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. And it’s all right for you to call me; he knew you had called me, but I didn’t tell him the other fellow had called me, and so I just didn’t want him to think I was playing games with him.

Right.

And I had a long talk with him. He is interested in it, but he has obligations that concern him deeply. I—he’s going to New York today. He’s going to talk to a lot of these people.

Yeah.

And he’s going to talk to the other man. He may have already; I don’t know. I spent, I guess, an hour and a half with him last night. I did not pressure him. He started out talking to me, and he brought it up to me.

Yeah.

So I didn’t have to tell him that the fellow had called me at all. [Smathers acknowledges.] I immediately told him that I thought that he would be a[n] expert at it, and he would do it well. And I’d be very happy to—if he felt like he could do it, that I thought it would . . . be good for the country. And that I always wanted to help the other President, because people have generally helped me to get the people I wanted. And where I had been deficient and made mistakes, it’s because I couldn’t get good troops.

And he said that he was honored by it, that he wanted to work with him, and he would try to conduct himself like I did with [Dwight D.] Eisenhower and like Eisenhower has with me and not spend the time carping and being personal.[note 3] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. That he owed several million dollars. That he was going to meet with a group of them that had borrowed the money today. That he had planned to go take some assignment to some school [Smathers acknowledges] and to do some lecturing, [to] make a living—he gets a pension of a little bit—and that he was going to live at home.

Yeah.

That he rather doubted that he would like to live up there and be confined to New York. He didn’t know who was going to be Secretary of State, didn’t know what the policy would be. That gave me reason to believe that he had some doubts, although he didn’t say to me that he was not going to or that he was going to. He listened to what I said very cooperatively and nicely, but he wound up by saying that he had to talk to these people today and that he didn’t know how he was going to get the party out of—they’re running several hundred thousand a month over at the [Democratic National] Committee. That they’ve added [Lawrence F.] Larry [O’Brien Jr.] and them. And that he owes 5 or 6 million [dollars] and several men have signed notes and lent their own money, and they’ve done it on the basis of him and his just walking out of here and kind of turning it over to [Edward M.] Teddy [Kennedy ] [D–Massachusetts] or somebody.[note 4] Lawrence F. “Larry” O’Brien Jr. was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs from 1961 to 1965; U.S. postmaster general from November 1965 to April 1968; and chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1968 to 1969 and 1970 to 1972. Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 until his death on 25 August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. That he just couldn’t quite see through that in any government position now. And that was about the net of the conversation.

When he went out the door, I said, “Now, I can’t make this assignment to you, but I think you’ve been a wonderful Vice President. I believe you’d make the best United Nations spokesman and the world spokesman we have ever had on television, and so forth, and I’m sure this man would back you, because I know that he wants to have a bipartisan administration. And he’s doing that with me, and I’m telling every Secretary that I have.”

I thought I gave a very off-the-record, not quotation, but they can—not-for-attribution, but as a backgrounder yesterday, the UP[I] [United Press International], and they got into this Nixon thing a great deal. [Smathers acknowledges.] And I went into some detail, and I read to him a little of it, showing how I felt about how we ought to work. And I said, “He’s the pilot of the ship, and he’s going across the water, and we’re all passengers on it, and I’ve got little [Patrick] Lyn [Nugent] in my lap.”[note 5] Patrick Lyndon “Lyn” Nugent was the son of Luci Baines Johnson Nugent and the grandson of Lyndon B. and Lady Bird Johnson.

That’s right.

“His daddy’s out in Vietnam, and I’m holding him. And I got my little granddaughter [Lucinda Desha Robb] in the other lap, Lady Bird [Johnson] has.[note 6] Lucinda Desha Robb was the daughter of Lynda Bird Johnson Robb and the granddaughter of Lyndon B. and Lady Bird Johnson. Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934, and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. And we run into a damn black electrical storm, and the radar tells the pilot to go up, and he goes up. And he can’t get out of it. And go down, he can’t get out of it. And we all get hysterical and we run up and knock the door down and go to pinching him and slamming him and putting pins in his seat and hitting his copilot and hitting him, and it doesn’t take long for that [Boeing] 707 to go down 17,000 feet and hit that water.”

Right.

“And we’re all gone then. Now, what advantage is it to us to give him hell? Why don’t we wait until he lands four years from now and go out there and campaign and say we could fly it faster, and better, but let’s don’t do it these four years.”

Right.

And he kind of agreed with it, and so he’s in that frame of mind. My judgment is, he’s not going to take it. I would not, could not say that. [Smathers acknowledges.] I think a lot—I think if he were told that his greatest friend in the world would be Secretary of State and that he would have freedom to enunciate policies, which I don’t think any U.N. ambassador will have—

Right.

—or should have—

Right.

—I think that he might change, although I rather doubt it. I rather think that he thinks he owes all this money, he’s got all this organization, that he wants to hold it together, and my guess is he’s going to run for Senate out there.

Mm-hmm.

He said that he wasn’t out of politics. I said, “Well, are you going to run for Senate?" He said, “I love the Senate.” And said, “I don’t know,” but said, “I want to stay there.”

Yeah. I told him that this fellow had told me that if he wanted to do that in two years, that this fellow would be certain that no responsible Republican ran against him. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] He could do this for two years, but he couldn’t, of course, guarantee a damn thing. But he said, “I sure as hell won’t be for the other fellow, and/or for any Republican.” That he threw that in the pot, I told our friend that.

I’ll tell you, I don’t know what he does. I don’t know what he’ll do. He’ll just have to see, and I don’t want to be nominating.

Right.

But I don’t think he can get this man.

Yeah.

But the—he is going to get in trouble in foreign relations unless he gets a very unusual man, [Smathers acknowledges] Secretary of State, Under Secretary, or United Nations. They’re so few and rare.

That’s right.

And particularly in his party, because they don’t look upon this thing in a . . . as I think they should. But he has selected the best man in my judgment available in this country, except [Dean] Rusk—[note 7] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.

Yeah.

—to work down here. And if he could get him to go to the United Nations, he would be exceptional, [Robert D. “Bob”] Murphy would.[note 8] Robert D. “Bob” Murphy was U.S. ambassador to Belgium from November 1949 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Japan from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from July 1953 to November 1953; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from August 1959 to December 1959; and an adviser to the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. I tried to get him. I offered him a job before I did [George W.] Ball.[note 9] George W. Ball was a Washington lawyer with an international practice; an adviser to Adlai E. Stevenson II in 1952, 1956, and 1960; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs in 1961; U.S. under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1968.

Yeah.

I plead with him, and he just said that he was there with Corning [Glass Works] and he didn’t think he could. I owe him nothing. I don’t know him except just sitting in meetings. I never had a social date with him. But he has—he’s with Clark [M.] Clifford’s board, and he was on it with, I guess, back in the—maybe the Eisenhower days and certainly the—all through Kennedy and through mine.[note 10] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. Here, President Johnson refers to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. And he has—I would put him second to Rusk in ability.

Yeah. [Unclear]—

I just say that he ought to know, he was offered it and turned down the United Nationship. [Smathers acknowledges.] Now, I hope that if he wants him, and Hubert wants it, that this works out. But the way I gathered it, if I had to flip a coin, I would say he’s not going to do it.

Right.

And if he’s not, I wouldn’t mess with him. I’d just try to get the best man I can.

Right.

I do think that as his friend, that you ought to insist as quickly as he can, that he get a man here for [Walt W.] Rostow’s place, whoever’s going to be his top man in the White House and whoever’s going to be his top man at State and Defense.[note 11] Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969.

Right.

Because I just don’t believe a man in 30 days can possibly take it and run it. I don’t think you can fly a 707 in 30 days.

Yeah. [Unclear.]

And if you’re going to have to fly it, you better get in there. Now, he’ll have men with experience, but he doesn’t know all these things that are coming up. I’m meeting now in a kind of an emergency meeting, with [Henry H. “Joe”] Fowler, Rusk, Clifford, [William McChesney] Bill Martin [Jr.] and all of them on the devaluation of the franc.[note 12] Henry H. “Joe” Fowler was U.S. under secretary of the treasury from February 1961 to April 1964, and U.S. secretary of the treasury from April 1965 to December 1968. William McChesney “Bill” Martin Jr. was chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from April 1951 to January 1970.

Right.

In addition to that, I’ve got a dozen new cables in on South Vietnam, and North Vietnam shot down a reconnaissance plane this morning, and ten Israelis were killed yesterday in the Middle East. The Soviets, they’re talking about going into Rumania. If they go in there like they did Czechoslovakia, the question is, what do we do when they go in there and Yugoslavia? Do we sit here and let them take all of Eastern Europe under their heel or what? Now, all those things are happening every second.

Right.

And those three men ought to be knowing it. If he’ll select men of competence [Smathers acknowledges] , we’ll turn them over everything to help them. Matter of fact, you remember [T.] Woodrow Wilson wrote [Robert] Lansing and said if [Charles Evans] Hughes is elected, as he thought he might very well be, that he believed he’d talk to the Vice President [Thomas R. Marshall] and get him to resign, and he and the Vice President resign instead of waiting till March. They’d appoint Hughes Secretary of State, and then the Secretary of State would become president, so the country wouldn’t be in that danger during that period.[note 13] T. Woodrow Wilson was president of Princeton University from 1902 to 1910; the Democratic governor of New Jersey from January 1911 to March 1913; and president of the United States from March 1913 to March 1921. Robert Lansing was counselor of the U.S. Department of State from April 1914 to June 1915, and U.S. secretary of state from June 1915 to February 1920. Charles Evans Hughes was an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from October 1910 to June 1916; U.S. secretary of state from March 1921 to March 1925; and chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from February 1930 to June 1941. Thomas R. Marshall was the Democratic governor of Indiana from January 1909 to January 1913, and vice president of the United States from March 1913 to March 1921. That was during the World War I.[note 14] Prior to the passage of the 1947 Presidential Succession Act, the Secretary of State was second in line of succession. Under the scenario that Johnson outlined, President Woodrow Wilson could have appointed his 1916 Republican challenger, Charles Evans Hughes, as his Secretary of State after the election, so that upon the resignation of Wilson and his Vice President, Hughes would have succeeded to the presidency before Inauguration Day 1917.

Yeah.

That didn’t happen because Wilson carried California.

Right.

And we’ve moved up March to January the—

Twentieth.

—the 20th. But it wouldn’t have been—it’d be wiser if they took over November the 6th.

That’s right.

Because this is very difficult, this period, and you know, when I made the decision on Vietnam, I had a treaty that they had signed 82–1 telling me to do it, and I got a Tonkin Gulf Resolution said, “You’re directed to deter aggression.” I got it 504–2, and even with that, they turned on me. Now, a fellow gets in over there now, and any of these things, the Middle East, you got no treaty. You got nothing.

That’s right.

And if you don’t get in, it’s too late. So it’s a very precarious and dangerous situation, and these boys always take . . . advantage of it.

That’s right.

And I think that every time he can, my mail shows universal approval. I haven’t received one criticism, and I’ve had more compliments of the President-elect and myself than I’ve ever had before on his statement out here, saying that we were going to be united. And I think every time that he can say that Murphy is following everything, and he is aware of it, and he’s keeping right up with everything, and that there’s no division on these things and going to be none until January the 20th, the better it is, because that doesn’t give the Russians any encouragement. They moved in—the Cuban Missile Crisis came October 22nd, just a few days before our election.

Yeah. Yeah, I know.

They do everything. And this bunch of fools that moved in and got South Vietnam not to go to the conference because of Nixon—

Yeah.

—they just screwed up everything. And we’ve—it’s taken us three or four weeks, and I didn’t expose it, because I just couldn’t use those sources.

Right.

And I didn’t want to hu[rt]—make it impossible for him to govern. I think if I had said to the country that this is—and exposed this, brought it out, I think it would’ve shocked the country so that he would have been seriously hurt.

Yeah.

And so I just told you, and he told [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] and got it kind of back on the track again.[note 15] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969.

Right.

But that damn woman is still messing around, causing trouble, that Ms. [Anna C.] Chennault.[note 16] Beijing-born Anna C. Chennault was a prominent Republican fundraiser and member of the China Lobby.

Yeah, Anna Chennault, yeah. All right, well, that’s very informative, and I’ll pass it on to the fellow in New York and tell him what you’ve said and what you said to the other fellow. And I’m sure he’ll appreciate it. And I’ll also tell him that you think—I told him this before, but I’ll emphasize it—it’s very important that he get somebody down there with you and your people soon—forthwith, as a matter of fact.

I think that it’s more important than his Secretaries or anything else, if he can find it so that they can start doing it. And if he could get this fellow to do anything, I’d do it.

Right.

Murphy.

Right.

And I’m not recommending that as a Democrat. I don’t know what he is.

Right.

If he’s anything. [Smathers attempts to interject.] Another man I think is superior that if he could get anywhere he ought to do it, which I doubt he can, is the fellow in Moscow, [Llewellyn E.] Tommy Thompson [Jr.].[note 17] Llewellyn E. “Tommy” Thompson Jr. was U.S. ambassador to Moscow from July 1957 to July 1962 and January 1967 to January 1969, and an ambassador-at-large of the U.S. Department of State from July 1962 to December 1966.

Yeah.

He told me that he considered him the best man in the service, as do I.

Yeah.

And that’s where his problem is. [Smathers acknowledges.] So—but you and I are not going to be worth a damn if we have a big depression and get in another war. [Smathers acknowledges again.] Won’t amount to a dime. They’ll make us go back to—

That’s right.

—camp or something, so we’ve got to help every way we can, and I’m going to. I’m not going to get in anything that holds back a second if they’d just trust me and if they don’t hit at me and don’t—old Hugh [D.] Scott [R–Pennsylvania] this morning, he says that Johnson called a bombing halt to affect the election, and he knows that’s not so.[note 18] Hugh D. Scott was a U.S. senator [R–Pennsylvania] from January 1959 to January 1977, and Senate Minority Leader from September 1969 to January 1977. I had no control when I called it. I told Nixon on the 16th [of October] I might do it in five minutes—

Yeah.

—because as soon as they take up my offer I had to do it. I can’t let them get out, and if they don’t go next week, I may have to go without them, because I can’t let Hanoi get off of this agreement.

Right, well, everybody knows Hugh Scott and [Melvin R.] Mel Laird [R–Wisconsin] are just real hatchet men.[note 19] Melvin R. “Mel” Laird was a U.S. representative [R–Wisconsin] from January 1953 to January 1969; chair of the House Republican Conference from January 1965 to January 1969; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973; and White House domestic affairs adviser from May 1973 to January 1974. They just—it’s in them. They just can’t help it. They’re going to say anything ugly they can. They always have, and they always will, but happily nobody pays too much attention to them.

Well—

So . . . As a matter of fact, the other night when I was eating with this fellow [Nixon] in New York, he told me that he wished Hugh Scott would shut up. But he can’t control him at the moment. And that’s just the way old Scott is.

Well, you tell him the reason I didn’t call him back was because I didn’t have to tell him that he had talked to me, and I thought it was more effective if I didn’t.

Right.

If I just told him as his friend that I thought it would be good if he wanted to do it, I would sure be for it.

Right.

I thought if I said, “This fellow’s called me,” it would be less effective. The reason I didn’t call him is not because I didn’t want to talk to him, but I just thought it would be more honorable [Smathers acknowledges] to just talk to you since you had originally raised it, and he’d get the information, and it’d just mean one extry telephone call.[note 20] President Johnson uses the colloquial pronunciation of “extra.”

OK.

Thank you, my friend.

All right, that’s great. I’m down here hunting today with Omar [T.] Burleson [D–Texas] and Bob [unclear] Texas.[note 21] Omar T. Burleson was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from January 1947 to December 1978. “Bob” is unidentified, though the surname Smathers says may have been “Creasy.”

Well, good. Give them my regards.

I’ll sure do it.

And I love you, and I hope that other thing, your home, works out. I just, sure, that upset me terribly, [Smathers acknowledges] because you’re too good a man to get a bad break there, and she’s too good—[note 22] In an earlier conversation, Smathers had told the President that his wife had left him, but he was hoping for a reconciliation. Smathers also had agreed to sell his Florida home to Richard Nixon, so that the President-elect could create a compound next door to his close friend Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo. See Conversation WH6811-07-13749-13750-13751.

Yeah.

Hello?

[Unclear.]

Yeah. Hello?

Wait just a moment.

Mr. President? [Unclear]—

Senator Smathers is still on the line.

Just a moment. [Pause.]

I just—I hit the wrong button here with my knee. I just said I hope all that works out, [Smathers attempts to interject] because the two of you are too wonderful not to. And I’ll say a prayer for you, and if there’s anything I can do, please call me.

Thank you very much.

Day or night. I’ll come. I’ll do anything that I could do.

All right, I sure appreciate it, Mr. President.

Good-bye.

Thank you.

Waiting. Waiting. Hello?