Hello?[note 2] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

Yes, please.

I want that call on [unclear].[note 3] President Johnson may have said “I want that call on here” or “I want that call on him.”

Mr. [Bryce N.] Harlow?[note 4] Bryce N. Harlow was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs from 1969 to 1970; and counselor to the president from 1970 to 1971 and from June 1973 to August 1974. Yes, sir. [The call connects.] There you are, Mr.—

Hello?

Mr. President?

Yes, Bryce.

I’m afraid I’m a little impudent to call you, but I wanted to—and I very much appreciate your courtesy of letting me talk. I was talking with Mr. [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon this afternoon.[note 5] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974. He told me of your call, and he was quite troubled over it. And I told him that you had told me the other evening to call you whenever I felt like it, and I thought I would do that. He was concerned whether or not it was being construed that he had indicated he had a veto right over your actions for the balance of your term. And he did not say that, and I was very fearful that the press was trying to read it this way and had so reported to you. And I was present when he had his press conference. And he very specifically did not say that and said exactly the opposite. And I wanted to make sure that that was understood by you, because he is trying to play the game, I think, exactly the way you want it played.

I was bothered, because we did not get the transcript, and they would like to divide us any way they can.

Well, of course, they [unclear]—

We could not see what he said. But the phrase that gave us trouble was not that he was sending [Robert D. “Bob”] Murphy as an observer, which he had stated to me in the telephone call, but that before we would take action, it would be necessary to have approval.[note 6] Robert D. “Bob” Murphy was U.S. ambassador to Belgium from November 1949 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Japan from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from July 1953 to November 1953; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from August 1959 to December 1959; and an adviser to the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. Now, that language is given in the—tonight in his television statement. I saw it on ABC [American Broadcasting Company] at seven o’clock. It very definitely connotes an agreement between us that (a) not only calls for an observer, (b) a consultation, but (c) approval.[note 7] End of 2021 revisions.

Oh. Well—

Now, that is in the language of all the wire services, so they were just murdering George [E.] Christian [Jr.].[note 8] George E. Christian Jr. was White House press secretary from February 1967 to January 1969. George Christian is very fair and wants to be very helpful to your people and is going to, as am I, because you’ve got all you can do without—with everybody helping, it’s going to be difficult enough. [Harlow acknowledges throughout.] So he held off his briefing until we could get a response. When we got ahold of the President-elect, I suggested to him, looking at the AP [Associated Press] ticker and the UP [United Press] ticker—I had not seen television at that time—the phrase that gave us trouble that said “approval.” When they ask him about veto, of course he said, “No, it doesn’t mean that at all.” When—the other questions came out good. But that statement, when he presented Murphy, went that far. So what George said to them—and I don’t have the text in front of me; I’m over at the house with a group of folks in the West Hall dinner, and I had to come in my bedroom to take it—but what George said was, “The President and the Secretary [Dean Rusk] asked the President-elect to designate his Secretary of State and Defense and budget director as quickly as possible.[note 9] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. That in the absence of that, because he would surely want to know about some of these things that—big problems that are troubling us now. In the absence of that, pick a man he had the most confidence in and send him here, and we would give him an office near Rusk, and he could act as a liaison.” So instead of my calling Nixon or Rusk calling Nixon or calling you, this man would be there. There are about 800 cables coming in now every day.

Right.

And some of them are matters that all of you ought to be aware of so that you just don’t get into it cold.

Right.

And so the President-elect agreed that he would like to do that, and he thought of one or two and called me this morning and said, quote, “I would like to send Mr. Murphy as my observer.” Now, that’s what he is going to be. Now, of course, he is leaning over backwards not to interfere and make this a two-president country. I’m leaning over backwards the same way.

That’s right.

And you fellows have got to do all you can and try not to divide us because—

Yeah, I think that’s—

—we saw in ‘60 what they did in Southeast Asia. President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower said to President [John F. “Jack”] Kennedy on January the 19th that “I would make this decision, except that it would be a problem for you, and I think that you will have to do it, but maybe you won’t do what I would do.”[note 10] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. John F. “Jack” Kennedy was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1947 to January 1953; a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from January 1953 to December 1960; and president of the United States from January 1961 until his assassination on 22 November 1963. In ‘62, in October the 22nd, they had the Cuban Missile Crisis eight days before an election—ten days before. So we have to watch that, and the best statement that has been made in my judgment, not only for the country but the world, and also from a political standpoint, was the President-elect’s statement the other evening that we would speak with an undivided voice until January the 20th. And my little statement that we were going to have this government function efficiently before January the 20th and after January the 20th. So—

Right, right.

—the important point is, some of them were interpreting this as running away from his statement the other day. They thought some people had put pressure on, and all the [New York] Times and [Washington] Post people, different ones, saying that this—here he is, he’s backing away. George Christian took this position: he said, “The President and Mr. Nixon had a meeting the other day and agreed that he would send an observer or a liaison man. Both of them stated to you their feelings before the microphone. Those feelings have not changed from that date. The only thing that’s changed is that Mr. Murphy has been designated as an observer, and the President and Secretary Rusk look upon him with great favor.” Something like that.

Mm-hmm.

Now, that’s where we are. I think that’s what we ought to stay with. Now, I don’t want to make any commitments or promises or obligations that I must do this or do that before I make a decision. Obviously, though, I’m not going to be calling on October the 16th to George [C.] Wallace [Jr.] and Hubert [H.] Humphrey [Jr.] and Dick Nixon if, on November the 16th, I would fail to discuss with Murphy or somebody else something that I thought they ought to know.[note 11] George C. Wallace Jr. was governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987; and a third-party candidate in the 1968 U.S. presidential election. Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968.

That’s right.

Now, it’s just a question of whether—how they interpret it. And I think we ought to try to say, “Well, I’m going to support our President just like I did all through the campaign and not undercut the negotiations.” I’m going to do the same thing: “I have every reason to believe that he has the same purpose I do: a good America. And that’s all we want. So you just let us handle it ourselves, reporters. And I stand on my statement made the other night, and the President stands on his, and that’s the last time we appeared publicly together, and we will be talking back and forth, and I expect rather frequently. But . . . and we will be cooperating.”

Now, this is good. Well—

[speaking over Harlow] If you look at the TV statement, it brings in the word “approval,” that we had an agreement that would require his approval.

Well, I’ll get [unclear]—

Now, that’s—you read that script, and you’ll find that lang[uage]—

I didn’t realize that the trouble was in his statement about Murphy.

Yes, that—

I thought it was in the question-and-answer part.

No—

I just went back [unclear]—

No, he said—his veto. He said, “No, it doesn’t give me any veto.” He hit that exactly right.

Yeah.

But they didn’t take that. They took the part that said that would require approval, and they said Nixon was backing out on what he said the other day. Now, the truth of the business is this press does not like me, and it does not like him any better.

That’s right.

Neither one of us going to get along with it as well as you did when you were here eight years ago.

That’s right.

But we have to lean over backwards for that reason to try to understand each other. And I’m going to do it. And I wouldn’t let them have a press briefing until we could call him. And I didn’t call him for the purpose of doing anything, except letting him know our problem here, (a), and (b) getting agreement from him on what we’d say.

Right.

Because if I go in and George Christian says, “No, we didn’t have any such agreement that required approval.” Well, then you’ve got a credibility thing.

Yeah, then it starts this whole thing off all over again. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Well—

[speaking over Harlow] And if you’ll see the President-elect’s statement, you’ll see that he says in there that “it would not only require counseling but would require approval.” Something to that effect, along that line. That’s what got them upset. I think they’re settled now. I met with four or five later this evening, and the whole tone of the questioning was based on the President-elect’s statement the other evening.

Mm-hmm.

And they were people like [William S.] Bill White and Crosby [S.] Noyes and [Kenneth G.] Ken Crawford and pretty responsible—[Richard L.] Dick Wilson—pretty responsible newspapermen.[note 12] William S. “Bill” White was a Pulitzer Prize–winning author and syndicated newspaper columnist; a longtime friend of Lyndon Johnson; and author of the 1964 biography The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson. Crosby S. Noyes was a foreign affairs correspondent for and editor of the Washington Star from 1947 to 1974. Kenneth G. “Ken” Crawford was manager of the Washington, D.C., bureau of Newsweek from 1954 to 1961, and its Washington columnist from 1961 to 1970. Richard L. “Dick” Wilson was a journalist for and the Washington, D.C., bureau chief of the Des Moines Register from 1950 to 1970, and a nationally syndicated columnist from 1970 to 1976. And all of them said, “Could you tell us why both of you are trying so hard to get along with each other these days?" I said, “Well, first, what you’ve read about our hatred for each other never has been so, that’s number one. Number two, I think we’re both old pros. Number three, the man helped me most in my job for five years was a president who preceded me, the only living one that preceded me. That is Mr. Eisenhower. I would hope that I could do as much for Mr. Nixon, period.”

That’s very fine. That’s very fine. Well, they’re trying so hard to split you folks, and that’s the reason I called.

Well, they’re not going to do that. Don’t you worry—don’t you ever worry about that. They’re not going to do that. We’ll check with you before we get in hot water, and you do the same thing.

All right, sir.

And come by here the first day you’re in town, and don’t feel any hesitancy. I’m going to depend on you to keep in touch with me and be sure that [Herbert G. “Herb”] Klein talks to George Christian.[note 13] Herbert G. “Herb” Klein was White House communications director from January 1969 to July 1973. Now, one of the weaknesses this afternoon is we did not have available the text.

Yeah. That’s [unclear]—

We called the boy, the young man, Nielson . . . ?

[Ronald L. “Ron”] Ziegler?[note 14] Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974.

Ziegler. We called Ziegler. But we never did get him. We’ve got to have communications, better communications. Army communication will have to come in and put them in. I think you ought to see any questions they ask us about y’all, and we ought to see yours just almost simultaneously about us, so we don’t get—

Don’t get crossways.

[with Harlow acknowledging throughout] I got crossways with the news secretary. Bill Moyers thought I was going across the nation.[note 15] Bill Moyers was deputy director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1964; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1967; White House press secretary from 1965 to 1967; and publisher of Newsday from 1967 to 1970. I had no intention. I was going to be operated on. [Harlow acknowledges.] But he implied that I would be going on a nationwide trip. So then they thought both of us were liars. And it was just a question of his not knowing what the doctors had told me I had to do. So these little things cause us trouble, and I think when you have press announcements, you ought to have a stenographic person there. If you don’t have them, let us get somebody there. You ought to have communications to send the press conference to this press office here, and we ought to do likewise. Because these are going to be testing times. And he ought to be where I can get him any time I call him. Even if he’s in a car.

Right.

And it ought to be likewise.

That’s right.

And you have perfect liberty to call me anytime, day or night. I stay awake a lot, and I don’t bother a bit, and I like to talk on the phone, and you—and I think Klein or Ziegler ought to talk to George Christian. He’s my key man.

Mm-hmm.

And [Walt W.] Rostow’s my key man.[note 16] Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969. And if they ask him a question on foreign policy that he doesn’t want to mix it up, think all he needs to do is pick up the phone and call Rostow. He’s a great admirer of President Eisenhower, and he worked for [John Foster] Dulles, you know.[note 17] John Foster Dulles was U.S. secretary of state from January 1953 to April 1959.

That’s right.

And he’ll just call them as you see them. You can take his advice or don’t take it, but you can at least communicate with him. And you call me anytime, and—because I want to help y’all as much as your [Eisenhower] administration helped me.

You’re real nice, sir. I very much appreciate it, and I very much appreciate our chatting. I’ll call [unclear]—

[speaking over Harlow] And I didn’t intend to leave the impression that I was irritated at all. I was just clarifying.

No, he was just concerned.

No, no. Tell him not to be. [Harlow acknowledges.] Just tell him—I’ll tell him when to be concerned. [Laughs.]

All right. [laughing] All right. Yeah, I think that’s probably right.

Thank you, my friend.

[laughing] All right.

Bye, bye.