Bryce?

Good morning, sir.

We have something going to require some good deal of [snorts] work this morning. Our briefing is at eleven o’clock. The—

Briefing?

Yes. We put it off yesterday from four until about five, and then we just stonewalled it. We told them that we hadn’t seen the text.

Oh, you’re speaking of a press briefing?

Yes.

I see.

And I think that the thing will—probably the best way to handle it would be for you to talk to Mr. [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon, the President-elect, and review his statement that he made there.[note 3] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974. We got it late yesterday evening.

Right.

And then maybe you and whoever he wants to handle it, talk to George [E.] Christian [Jr.], [Harlow acknowledges] my press secretary, and Walt [W.] Rostow.[note 4] George E. Christian Jr. was White House press secretary from February 1967 to January 1969. Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969. Now, we just didn’t have any of these agreements, Bryce. This bit—

In other words, the construction that has come off of this from Dick is possibly cockeyed.

Our notes and all of our discussions do not reflect that we had any agreement at all that [snorts] he would approve all of our decisions, and that I would give assurance to foreign governments that both parties had approved, and that it would be essential that there be prior consultation and prior agreement. I don’t think he would want that; certainly, we don’t. [A telephone rings in the background.] What we suggested was that he select his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and budget director as soon as he could, so they could be here and follow what was taking place and be aware of the decisions being made, and try to be up on it, and be here as observers. And, of course, we would review with them what was going in and coming out, and he would have his contact here.

Mm-hmm.

Now, as for bringing in another president, and sitting him there, and before you do anything, both of you check it out, [snorts] we didn’t have any discussions of that at all. [Harlow acknowledges.] And that’s not in any of the notes.

Now, these two things did happen that may—that lend some credence to his thinking: [Dean] Rusk had a statement that he was planning to inject into his NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] discussion, which said that there would be no change in our viewpoint on NATO with a change in administration.[note 5] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.

Yes.

Now, he said, “Here’s what I’ve been thinking of saying; of course, I wouldn’t want to say that if you didn’t feel it, but I read your speeches, and I’m sure this is accurate, and the President looked at it, President Nixon, and said, ‘Of course.’” Now, that did happen. But that’s—that was a very—that pertained just to a specific statement that Rusk was making. There are 800 cables coming in here every day, and going out. [Harlow acknowledges.] And obviously, we don’t want to get two presidents. Now, we have no desire to do anything that would be embarrassing or that would—

Be complicated.

—or be—handicap him.

Yes.

We asked him to make clear that he was not going to give Saigon a better deal than we did—

Right.

—which he did do, but that was necessary because his people had told the folks that they ought to hold out and wait.[note 6] President Johnson is referring to the Chennault Affair, in which the Nixon campaign secretly urged South Vietnam to boycott the Paris Peace Talks before the election. For more on that subject, see, for example, Conversation WH6811-01-13706.

Mm-hmm.

[Chuckles.] And they—so they just—they started doing it, and that’s why we haven’t got a conference going. So we asked him to do that, and he got [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] to do it, and did a very effective job, we hope.[note 7] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969. We believe that’s going to come around.

Now, naturally, with [Robert D. “Bob”] Murphy, we have every confidence in Murphy, and we’ll be talking to Murphy about everything that’s important that comes in.[note 8] Robert D. “Bob” Murphy was U.S. ambassador to Belgium from November 1949 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Japan from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from July 1953 to November 1953; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from August 1959 to December 1959; and an adviser to the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. But the way this reads, it looks like he and I—well, first of all, he made the statement the other day—

Yeah.

—that I would—the decisions would be the decisions of one government. I didn’t ask for that statement. I thought it was a good statement. I thought it was good for both of us. Now, this is being interpreted here that he made the statement and some people either objected to it or advised against it or something, and this is kind of an attempt to—out in public to either—move away from it and show it was based on some agreement, which it was not. I was as surprised when he said it as the press was, although I heartily approve of it. But it wasn’t based on any agreement that there would always “be prior consultation and prior agreement,” and that these would be joint decisions, because they just can’t be.

All right. He . . . Mr. President, he does not—he’s trying very hard not to say something wrong about any of this, and he’s concerned about it. He’s trying very hard to make this operate in a way that his impending taking over the presidency does not complicate the last 60 days here. Maybe it’s been kind of goofed up a little. The question now is, I suppose, as to how this is handled to make sure that, number one, that there is no misunderstanding; number two, that the public doesn’t have one; and number three, that what is said doesn’t complicate still more the conduct of what you’re doing abroad. It’s a little sticky, I guess. Do you think this dictates the desirability of a clarifying statement by him, or to have a clarifying statement from there that he would—that he might find adequate from his point of view also, on a private basis, or how?

I think that probably what I had thought I might do is we might talk to [snorts] Murphy when he came in, but our trouble is, we’re fighting this eleven o’clock briefing. We can’t stonewall it another day.

Yeah.

And just have—maybe have him clarify it when he came out, to say, “Well, of course, I’ll be—I’m here as an observer. I’m a liaison man between the two Presidents. I’ll follow these matters very closely, and I’ll keep the President informed, just as President Johnson has, during this interim period here. And I have no doubt but what we’ll . . . keep President Nixon with all the information that we have,” and maybe something like that. “If there’s any important matter that the President desires to consult about, why, of course we’ll ask the President-elect to come in.” I don’t think they’re going to let us get by with that. They think now that we had some secret agreement, when he was here with Rusk and [Clark M.] Clifford, that he really announced yesterday.[note 9] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. Do you follow me?

Yes.

Now, we didn’t have that. Now, I don’t know how to get away from it.

You mean the press thinks there is?

Yes, yes.

“The press now”—I’m going to write—I’m writing this down—“now believes there is a secret or private understanding that RN”—that’s Nixon—“has a prior consulting relationship . . . which does not really exist. The question is how to—"

I think that if you and—

"—straighten this out.”

—after you talk to Nixon, if you would talk to George Christian and Rostow; I haven’t talked to either of them this morning. I’m eating breakfast with the archbishops, some of them that are here, and I’ll be through in 10 or 15 minutes. I’d called before I started breakfast and you were on the way to the office—

[Unclear.]

—but I thought—it was 9:30, what you all ought to do is decide . . . George may have an idea, Rostow may have an idea, or [Ronald L. “Ron”] Ziegler or [Herbert G. “Herb”] Klein may have one.[note 10] Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974. Herbert G. “Herb” Klein was White House communications director from January 1969 to July 1973. We don’t want to get in any debate or any argument if we can avoid it. We don’t want, on the other hand, the record to stand [Harlow acknowledges] that he and I have entered into an agreement whereby no decision will be made that’s not joint between now and January 20th, because that’s just not a fact.

Yeah. [speaking under his breath as he writes down what President Johnson has said] “No statement be made before January that is not joint.”

Now, what we look upon Mr. Murphy to do, and what we asked him to do, what we urged the President-elect to do, is to designate a liaison man or, in his language, Nixon called him “his observer.”

That’s—mm-hmm. In other words, the point is that the role of Murphy has got to be made clear—that he is only an observer. [President Johnson snorts.] “Number two”—let’s see—“one, only an observer. Number two, no . . .[note 11] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. No veto. That was made clear.”

He made that very clear yesterday, but it’s a little inconsistent. [speaking over Harlow] Let me read you this statement: “Would you clarify a point on the need for agreement on the course of action? Are you saying that the President will not take a course of action unless you have approved of it?” Nixon: “We did not discuss it that precisely.” So he handles it—that well there. But then he goes on a little longer, and he says, “Do you think of dealing with ABMs [antiballistic missiles], which Johnson’s anxious to initiate—is that also included in this arrangement?” Now, bear in mind, Bryce, we’ve had no arrangement.

Yes, I know.

We just asked a man to come here and follow it, that’s all. There’s no arrangement. There’s no deal. There’s no secret. There’s no contract. Then Nixon replies— [rereading the last question aloud] “Is that also included in the whole arrangement?” Nixon said, “Yes, anything. Any subject in the whole general field of foreign policy will be within Ambassador Murphy’s assignment.” Now, that’s all right, up to that point. [speaking deliberately] “And, of course, as far as any decision on that is concerned, like obviously any arrangement with the Soviet Union, it would be essential that there be prior consultation and prior agreement.” [Chuckles.]

Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Yeah—

[chuckling] Ah, so—

—I see. I see your concern.[note 12] End of 2021 revisions.

Now, [Harlow attempts to interject] I don’t want to take anything that would be embarrassing or bind him or problems; I will initiate things that I think that ought to be discussed with him, or—but Rusk wanted Murphy there just to bring him up to date or bring his Secretary of State up to date, and make him familiar with these things and let him be kind of a briefer for the Vice—for Nixon.

Right.

But we don’t want to—We can’t live with this, you see. The world can’t live with it. They don’t know who to take it up with.

Yeah. Of course, it’s too bad, because what he was trying to do, and apparently it’s goofed—what he was trying to do was to keep any of these countries [from] sitting around and waiting until he took over the office.

He’s done that perfectly in his statement out here the other day.

Yeah, and—

But these people think that since then, somebody has objected to that and thought it went too far from a political standpoint. Now, [Harlow attempts to interject] his statement at the White House the other day—he didn’t tell me what he was going to say at all.

Right.

He just walked out and said it extemporaneously. But it said it well, and we thought it left things in good shape for the government—for both of us, between now and [January] the 20th, and certainly for him after the 20th. And we thought that it was generally regarded as statesmanship. We got a lot of wires congratulating the two of us on his statement.

Now, I don’t know how to really get back to that. What Christian said last night, and I ought to have him read you that, as soon as you hang up; you ought to hear what he said. I think the net effect of what he said—that there’s nothing—that no agreement [has] been entered into, nothing that diluted the presidency between now and January the 20th. That the position, in effect, was right where it was when we talked the other day, when we personally spoke by ourselves.

[speaking as he takes notes] Right, just like it was.

Now, that’s what—

Yeah, that’s what—

—that’s what Nixon and I agreed on when I called him. But the papers and the television—and if you’ll look at the film on television, he just says that there’ll be nothing done unless there’s prior agreement.

Well—

And I’d say that there are 800 communications that are going—went out last night [chuckling] that there aren’t any agreement on.

Yes.

And it may be a million-dollar grant to an African company, or it may be a message to [Alexei] Kosygin that says, “Get your troops on out of Czechoslovakia, and then we’ll try to talk to you on the missiles.”[note 13] Alexei Kosygin was chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union from October 1964 to October 1980.

Yes, well—

And now, none of those things he and I are going to be sitting down on.

Yes—

Now, obviously, if I sat down with him [Kosygin] and came to an agreement, and decided I was going to enter into a treaty that would bind the United Nations—the United States for ad infinitum, anybody with any judgment would not only want to talk to the President coming in, but the leaders and everybody else. But he [Nixon] and I have not got into that, and we have not entered into any agreement, and we can’t let the people think we have.

All right. Well, I think that what prompted all of this is the last statement you just made. It’s that “of course” statement, you know.

Yeah.

And I think that’s what Dick was referring to, because he was saying in effect, “Of course.” And on these long-term things that would embroil the next administration heavily in a governmental policy that, [President Johnson coughs] of course, there would be consultation about that. He was just saying, “Well, of course.” And apparently this thing has gone—and can be read as going—too far.

Well, now, he has called for me, and I’ll take these notes right into him right now, tell him of our chat, then I’ll get the script, and I’ll go over it, see what we do, and then—when is your briefing did you say?

Eleven o’clock.

Eleven.

And that could always be fudged 10 or 15, 20 minutes. It’s not my briefing; it’s George Christian’s.

It’s George Christian.

We have two a day: one at eleven [o’clock] and one at four [o’clock]. Now—

It might be that as we plow into this one—I think that it is highly, highly important, as I know you do, that what is said now is—be said in a way that cleans it but does not complicate it still more.

I stonewalled it last night with some press that were talking to me, when they said, “Well, now, does that mean you all have got an exchange agreement, and it’s something the other day that you all entered into, and you didn’t talk about it when you came out?" And I said, “No, not one thing. We have asked of Mr. Nixon, on our own, the President and the Secretary of State, to send a liaison man. That was the language we used to get the man that was closest to him in foreign policy, preferably the man to be his Secretary of State, if not, who—the next man he could. He talked about getting an ambassador, but because he didn’t want to take him away from his post, he selected Mr. Murphy. He called me and said, quote, ‘I’m sending Mr. Murphy as my observer.’”

“Now, we have that agreement, and we will be reviewing with Mr. Murphy every day the things that come in and out, and we’ll keep in close contact, and if there’s any disagreement or anything—we wouldn’t anticipate it, because Mr. Murphy serves on the Board of—the President’s [Foreign Intelligence] Advisory Board—and we meet with him all the time, from time to time. And [Harlow acknowledges] we think there’ll be a very good inflow of information to him for the President and be very pleasant.” They didn’t shove me anymore. They did shove Christian and my press secretary, even into the night—my deputy [Wyatt T.] Tom Johnson—by saying, “Well, now, we can understand why Nixon said what he did last Monday, because he’d had an agreement with Johnson, that Johnson wouldn’t do anything without (a) consulting him, and (b) without his agreement.”[note 14] Wyatt T. “Tom” Johnson was a White House Fellow from 1965 to 1966, and an aide to Lyndon B. Johnson during and after his presidency.

Well, now, that we can’t live with, [Harlow acknowledges] because we didn’t have that agreement. We talked to Rusk and Clifford and Rostow and all of them, and we just didn’t do it. We just asked him to send an observer. Clifford asked him to do the same thing for Defense—the quicker the better—so he could become familiar with it. Now, that’s the extent of our agreement. Now, what we would hope to do with Murphy and whoever he sends to Defense would be to keep them familiar and let them follow as much as they could the day-to-day operation so that he would be in maximum strength when he takes the responsibility at noon, January the 20th.

Right.

Now, in the meantime, if somebody said, “Well, Nixon has indicated that ‘better wait for me,’” why, then, it held up an agreement, I would call him, as I did the other day, and say, “You get Murphy or Dirksen, or somebody—go tell these people they’re misjudging you.”

Well. [Clears throat.] Now, I’ll talk to him, and then I guess the next course is to talk to Christian.

That’s right. And I’ll have him standing by and have Rostow standing by and you put anybody you want on, or I’ll be glad to talk to the President-elect or anything. I don’t want to get in an argument or fight or difference or—I want to be helpful, and I don’t want to change anything that he said either Monday or yesterday, but they are not at all consistent.

Very good. Very good.

OK. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. President.